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Case Notes
CIVIL RIGHTS-Employment Testing in Public Sector Must Demonstrate Reasonable Relationship to Particular Job in Order to Comply
with Requirements of Equal Protection Clause. Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
The City of New York, pursuant to the New York State Education

Law,' required all candidates seeking permanent positions as principals
and assistant principals in the city school system to pass an examination
prepared and administered by the Board of Examiners. Plaintiffs, black
and Puerto Rican candidates, initiated a class action alleging the ex-

amination to be discriminatory against minority group candidates.2
Plaintiffs Chance and Mercado are state certified principals appointed

by their local school boards on a temporary basis, pending successful
completion of the examination. Chance failed the examination and Mercado has refused to take it because of its alleged irrelevancy.' Relying on
statistical data prepared cooperatively by both sides and after hearing extensive expert testimony, the district court found a sufficient showing of

discrimination. 4 The court examined whether the test in fact measured
the knowledge and skills required by the positions in question.' It found
1. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2573(10), 2590-j(3) (a) (1) (McKinney 1971).
2. Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g 330 F.
Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3. 330 F. Supp. at 208.
4. Id. at 209. The district court received in evidence a lengthy statistical study
prepared cooperatively by both sides which attempted to delineate a pattern of
test results involving substantial differences between minority group applicants and
other applicants. The court stated that "the Survey reveals that out of 6,201
candidates taking most of the supervisory examinations given in the last seven (7)
years, including all such examinations within the last three (3) years, 5,910 were
identified by race. Of the 5,910 thus identified, 818 were Black or Puerto Rican
and 5,092 were Caucasian. Analysis of the aggregate pass-fail statistics for the
entire group reveals that only 31.4% of the 818 Black and Puerto Rican candidates passed as compared with 44.3% of the 5,092 white candidates." Id. at
210. On the basis of these and other similar statistics, the court found discrimination. The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that discrimination is
shown by the disparity in proportions between the black and Puerto Rican student
population of the schools and the disproportionately low number of black and
Puerto Rican principals and assistant principals. Id. at 213.
5. Id. at 214. "[Tihe evidence establishes to our satisfaction that the examinations prepared and administered by the Board for licensing of supervisory personnel in New York City schools do have the de facto effect of discriminating

CASE NOTES
no rational relationship between the test criteria and the job requirements
and granted a preliminary injunction against the Board of Examiners'
further use of the examination. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in affirming the district court decision,6 noted that,

unless a reasonable relationship between the test and the jobs could be
demonstrated by the employer, the classifications created by the examination were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
7
amendment.
In striking down the tests as unconstitutional, the court of appeals

holding has two significant aspects. First, it imposes the requirement
of job relatedness to examinations given by the Board of Examiners to

persons seeking supervisory positions in the city school system. Second,
in determining the requirements of the equal protection clause, the court
applied the standards developed for determining the acceptability of

tests administered by private employers under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,8 to the requirements of the equal protection clause
in this area.
Since 1965 when Title VII became effective' the courts have develsignificantly and substantially against qualified Black and Puerto Rican applicants. However, the existence of such discrimination, standing alone, would not
entitle the plaintiffs to relief .... The goal of the examination procedures should
be to provide the best qualified supervisors, regardless of their race, and if the
examinations appear reasonably constructive to measure knowledge, skills and
abilities essential to a particular position, they should not be nullified because of
a de facto discriminatory impact." Id.
6. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
7. Id. at 1175.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Title VII standards are more fully explained
in the text. Briefly, the Title requires that all tests given as a condition to employment, as a method of determining job placement, as a criterion to promotion, or as
a condition to retention, as well as for other purposes, be job related. Thus, the test
must have a reasonable relationship to the job requirements for which it is given
and the test must be in some way validated. Validation, despite contrary language
contained in the EEOC guidelines, has come to mean job related as determined by
some professional group or by the courts. See note 22 infra.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). The purpose
of the Act is "to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent
problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation by establishments
doing business with the general public, and by labor unions and professional,
business, and trade associations." U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2401 (1964) The purpose of Title VII is "to eliminate . . .discrimina-

tion in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin." In
broad terms, the title defines what shall be considered an unlawfully discrimina-
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oped criteria for judging the acceptability of tests when administered by
private employers to persons attempting to find employment, or seeking
transfer or promotion within their establishments. Title VII has been
successfully used to strike down discriminatory testing in the private

sector, 10 as well as other discriminatory employment practices of labor
unions and private employers."1

Although it was specifically inapplicable to the states and their instrumentalities, 2 the courts have applied the requirements of Title VII,
through the vehicle of the equal protection clause, in striking down dis-

criminatory testing in the public sector.
While the Chance case is not directly concerned with Title VII it will
tory employment practice and establishes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
10. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971)
(seniority, transfer and promotion practices); United States v. National Lead Co.,
438 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1971) (seniority systems); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d
117 (10th Cir. 1971) (sex discrimination); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421
F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970) (sex discrimination in pay); Papermakers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (referral systems); United States v. Sheet
Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 919 (1969)
(seniority systems).
12. "[Blut such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation
wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or a State
or political subdivision thereof .

. . ."

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970). On March 24, 1972 the above quoted section was
amended making Title VII applicable to the states and their subdivisions. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The
impact of this amendment should be marked. Discriminatory hiring practices by
states and their subdivisions will be brought within the purview of the EEOC and
will be subject to the Commission's cease and desist orders. The significance of the
change will probably be more procedural than substantive. Substantively, the requirements of Title VII have been made binding on the states through the equal

protection clause. Procedurally, the process of enforcing these requirements has
been judicial-the amendment would make this process administrative. For the
legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, see U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1005 (1972). The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (a) (1970) provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . .

."

Id.

For the legislative history of this portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2401 (1964).
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be useful to examine these standards since the requirements of the equal
protection clause in its application to the public sector have been greatly
influenced, if not controlled, by the standards developed for Title VII.'3
In the area of testing, the primary requirement that the courts have
imposed on private employers is that of job relatedness.1 4 Employment
testing has become widespread in the United States.'" Studies have shown,
however, that minority groups, when considered statistically as a group,
do not score as well as whites on many of these tests.1 6 There are many
factors that account for this disparity of performance:
[C]rucial factors in a person's score are the quality and extent of his past schooling
and training and the degree of c6rrelation between his cultural milieu and that
which serves as the test's point of reference...
The general patterns of racial discrimination, lesser educational and cultural
opportunities for black people, and cultural separatism that have marked our
society for generations have impeded blacks in attaining the background necessary
for success on existing standardized tests.17

The problem confronting the courts in this area presents an interesting
dichotomy. On the one hand, Congress has created Title VII as a vehicle
for ending discriminatory employment practices.18 On the other hand,
that title specifically provides for the continuation of employer testing:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' 9

The crucial words of the above quoted section were "professionally
13. There are a plethora of articles concerning Title VII. For a comprehensive
overview of the title, see Hill, The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 43 U. Col. L.
Rev. 243 (1972); Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public
Law-Part I, 14 Viii. L. Rev. 664 (1969).
14. 330 F.Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.1971).
15. While there are no actual figures compiled, the extent of such testing is
vividly demonstrated in Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 691 (1968).
16. Id. This article contains a thorough review of various tests and a detailed
analysis of the differences in the scores of various racial groups.
17. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A

General Approach to Ojective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1598, 1639, 1640 (1969). This study has been cited often by the courts indecisions related to employment and labor practices.
18. See notes 11 and 15 supra.
19. Civil Rights Act § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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developed" and a determination of their meaning was central. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter EEOC], established
with the enactment of Title VI120 and charged with enforcement of the
Act,"' interpreted the words in the following manner:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test" to
mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the
employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job
or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization
claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within
the meaning of Title VII.22
20. Id. §§ 705-06, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
21. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). § 705 establishes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and enumerates its powers. § 706 outlines the
methods of enforcement available. Such methods range from informal, strictly off
the record attempts at persuasion to court action when such attempts fail.
22. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17, at 1653-54 (1969), quoting CCH Empl.
Prac. Guide
16,904, at 7319. For the complete guideline of the EEOC in the
testing area see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 to .14 (1972). For present purposes, however,
two of the most important sections are § 1607.1(a) and § 1607.4(c). § 1607.1(a)
provides: "The guidelines in this part are based on the belief that properly
validated and standardized employee selection procedures can significantly contribute to the implementation of nondiscriminatory personnel policies, as required
by title VII. It is also recognized that professionally developed tests, when used
in conjunction with other tools of personnel assessment and complemented by
sound programs of job design, may significantly aid in the development and
maintenance of an efficient work force and, indeed, aid in the utilization
and conservation of human resources generally." § 1607.4(c) provides: "Evidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data demonstrating that
the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates
are being evaluated." These guidelines have been criticized as being unrealistically
strict. Comment, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971). Much has been
said in the literature as to whether other guidelines require that the test be predictive
of future job performance in order to be valid, or whether the guidelines merely
require that the tests are reasonably relevant to the job performance needs of the
employer. However, as made clear in the above cited article: "If theoretically objectionable, the Guidelines have apparently not been rigorously applied in practice.
They do speak of 'feasibility,' and this notion has influenced the Commission's
interpretation of the validation and alternative showing requirements. Many tests
have been approved which do not satisfy the standards of 'classical validation.'
Where such validation would not be feasible, the Commission has often settled
for concurrent validation, which can be carried out with present employees and
without having to hire a group of applicants who have not passed the test, or
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The EEOC's guidlines have been given great weight by the courts, as will
become apparent from a review of the cases. In Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,23 the district court was presented with a situation in which
the defendant employer, beginning in 1963, required all applicants for
production or maintenance positions to achieve certain minimum scores
on several standardized tests. This requirement was later extended to all

employees seeking transfer to these positions from less desirable parts of
the plant. The disparity in the results achieved by those tested was evident to the court.24 In granting the injunction against further testing the
court held that:
[Where] an employer adheres to a practice which significantly prefers Whites over
Negroes, that practice must fall before Title VII unless the employer can show
business necessity for it.25

Before a practice which substantially prefers whites over blacks will be
upheld, the employer must demonstrate business necessity, i.e., the skills
measured by the test are relevant to the employer's job performance
needs.26
synthetic studies. In addition, it has allowed the use of 'rational' validation techniques like 'content validity' ...."84 Harv. L. Rev. at 1131. As shall become
clear from the cases reviewed in this note, the courts have accepted the rational
relationship criteria as opposed to the requirement of predictiveness.
23. 319 F. Supp. 314 (E. D. La. 1970) See also Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 397 U.S. 919 (1969); Hicks v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971).
24. 319 F. Supp. at 318. In tests given by the employer, of the whites tested,
37.3% passed, while 9.8% of the blacks tested passed. Id. at 318. The court also
noted: "There was no claim that defendants had adopted the tests for the express
purpose of capitalizing on these differential passing rates, nor was evidence adduced to support such a claim. Rather, it was the effect of the tests in opening
jobs to a high percentage of whites while excluding all but a small percentage of
Negroes which plaintiffs challenged." Id. at 318.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 319. As the court later noted: "No reason appears why Crown Zellerbach's use of tests should not also be governed by the rule that business necessity must be shown to justify a practice which substantially prefers whites over
Negroes. .

.

. [Tihis simply means that the skills measured by the tests must be

shown to be relevant to the employer's job performance needs." Id. See also U.S. v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1969). The test in question was
instituted on the recommendation of Crown's personnel department without professional study. All of the expert witnesses who testified agreed that these tests had
no relevance to the lower and middle level jobs in the plant. A permanent injunction against the use of the test, and the requirement of a high school diploma, was
granted in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971).
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Undoubtedly, the most significant decision in the area of testing is the
recent Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." Prior to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the defendant company
had practiced a policy of open discrimination at its Dan River plant.
Following the passage of the Act the company required a high school
diploma of all employees holding positions other than laborers, positions
traditionally held by blacks.2 1 Subsequently, the company instituted a
testing program and required either a high school, diploma or certain
minimum scores on the tests for employment in, or transfer to, positions
other than laborers' positions.2 1 In deciding the case the Court looked to
the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII:
[Tihe objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. 80

Thus, the Court interpreted Congress' action as mandating the removal
of arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when such barriers
operate to invidiously discriminate on the basis of racial or other imIn other cases employers have tried to circumvent the requirements of Title VII
by offering equal pay for racially segregated jobs. The courts have been quick to
strike down such attempts. The court in United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969) made it clear that: "[T]his Court will not be misled
by the 'equal pay' or 'substantial pay' tests as indication of the absence of a violation of Title VII, for Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not an equal pay
provision but an equal opportunity to the full enjoyment of employment rights."
27, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), noted in 40 Fordham L. Rev. 350 (1972).
28. 401 U.S. at 427.
29. In determining the efficacy of employment tests, it is necessary to keep in
mind the point made by Cooper & Sobol, supra note 17: "It is sometimes argued
that standardized intelligence tests are inherently related to business needs on the
ground that every employer is entitled to prefer more intelligent employees. Similarly, mechanical comprehension tests are sometimes thought of as related to business needs in any industrial situation where machinery is used. This notion misconceives the function of tests. Industrial employers need people who can do
industrial jobs better; to the extent that requires a certain mental capacity, the
employer can be said to need a more 'intelligent' employee or one with certain
kinds of comprehension. But a paper and pencil test asking general questions does
not necessarily measure the relevant mental capacity." Id. at 1643.

30. 401 U.S. at 429, 430.
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permissible grounds."1 When employment practices create such a discriminatory effect they must be justified on the basis of business necessity. 2 Additionally, practices which have such an effect must have a
manifest relationship to the employer's job performance needs.-3
On the basis of the decision in Griggs, the requirements of Title VII
are somewhat clarified. Before a private employer may use a test which,
in its operative effect, appears to discriminate on the basis of race it
must be demonstrated to be business related, i.e., to have a demonstrable business necessity. The fact that the test has been professionally
prepared is not in itself sufficient-the test must meet the criteria of
business necessity.
Discriminatory Practices by States and Municipalities
Prior to the most recent amendment, Title VII was inapplicable to
the states and their instrumentalities.34 To circumvent this problem the
equal protection clause has been used as a vehicle for striking down such
discriminatory hiring practices by states and municipalities. 5 In short,
the standards which were outlined above for Title VII in the private
sector have become equal protection standards in the area of state and
municipal hiring. Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority36 illustrates the application of the equal protection standard in the
area of municipal testing. In that case a class action was brought against
the Transportation Authority under the equal protection clause charging
discriminatory employment practices. The Authority required all job
applicants to take a standardized test. Persons tested were then ranked
according to their scores with jobs being offered to persons on the list
according to their rank.3 Noting the disparity in the scores of black and
white applicants, the court went on to comment on the efficacy of such
classifications:
31. Id.at431.
32. Id. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.
33. Id. at 432. A lower court case, with tacts similar to Griggs, is United States
v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 327 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Va. 1971).
34. See note 11 supra.
35. See notes 36, 40, 41, 44 and 46 infra.
36. 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
37. Id. at 1357. Of 1,533 persons tested, with 300 being black, only 60 blacks
were in the first 1,000 on the list. As a result, the majority of blacks tested would
be excluded from employment. Id. at 1357-58.
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Whenever state action is creative of a classification among its citizens such that
burdens or benefits flow unequally, that classification is constitutionally suspect.
The legitimacy of the objectives producing the classification must be adequately
justified and of sufficient importance to overcome the evils of the inequality
engendered. 88

Further, the practice need not have been implemented with any discriminatory intent. When the effect of a state's actions is to deny to some
of the state's citizens rights that should be available to all, there must be
a compelling justification. 9
Interestingly, however, the "compelling interest" test was not applied.
Rather, the court simply required the examination to be job related only:
A hiring practice related to ability to perform is not itself unfair even if it means
that disadvantaged minorities are in fact adversely affected.
However, if there is no demonstrated correlation between scores on an aptitude
test and ability to perform well on a particular job, the use of the test in determining who or when one gets hired makes little business sense. When its effect is to
discriminate against disadvantaged minorities, in fact denying them an equal opportunity for public employment, then it becomes unconstitutionally unreasonable
40
and arbitrary.

Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 4' another case
involving municipal testing with a discriminatory impact, also demonstrates the use of the equal protection clause in the area of municipal
testing. Here an action was brought against the Mayor of San Francisco
38. Id. at 1358.
39. Id. See also note 58 infra.
40. Id. The court found no relation between the test and the job requirements
but denied delief because there was no irreparable injury. Id. at 1359-60. Another
Massachusetts case, Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971) mod.
459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), concerned alleged discriminatory hiring practices
of the Boston police department. The police department, pursuant to a study on the
improvement of the police force, instituted certain requirements as a precondition
to employment: holding a high school diploma and the attainment of a minimum
score on a written examination. The court upheld the high school diploma requirement as being job related because of the prior study but struck down the written
test because it had not been validated as being job-related. In explaining the
requirements of the equal protection clause in this area the court said: "If a job
requirement has in fact a significant relation to successful or improved job performance and is adopted bona fide by an employer exclusively on that account,
and not as a mere device intended covertly or openly to discriminate against some
racial or like minority group, the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection is
met." 334 F. Supp. at 939. For another case involving hiring practices by police
departments see Penn. v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
41. 330 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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to enjoin the city from administering qualifying examinations to prospective volunteer firemen. Plaintiffs contended that as a result of this test
requirement, de facto discrimination was apparent in the personnel selection of the city's firemen.42 The court found a sufficient showing of discrimination and determined that it would grant the injunction unless
the city justified the selection method by showing a reasonably necessary
connection between the qualities tested in the examination and the
actual requirements of the job to be performed. 48 It is interesting to
note that in this case the court felt "obliged" to follow.the- standards
used in Title VII cases. 44 Other courts have also equated the equal

protection standard with the requirements of Title VII in this area:
Because defendants are a public agency and its officers, their actions are governed
45
not by Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon de'fendants prohibitions against race discrimination that are at least as great as
those levied upon private employers in Section 703.46
42. Id. at 537. Of the city's 1,800 firemen only 4 were black. Id.
43. Id. at 539. Further, the court makes clear that the constitutional test to be
applied is that of job-relatedness: "[W]here the hiring practice of a public agency
(even though it does not intend to discriminate against minority groups) has the
effect of producing a de facto pattern of racial discrimination, such a discriminatory effect, although it does not necessarily render the method of selection
constitutionally defective, does render the method of selection sufficiently suspect
to make a prima facie case of unconstitutionality.
Under such circumstances the burden shifts to the public agency to justify the
use of such generalized hiring tests by showing some rational connection between
the qualities tested by the written examination and the actual requirements of the
job to be performed." Jd.
44. Id. Another case involving the hiring of firemen, Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), wherein the City of Minneapolis had imposed the requirement of a high school diploma and the attainment of a certain minimum score
on a standardized test. The district court had overturned both requirements, the
former because it was not job-related and the latter because it had not been validated as being job-related. In Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.
Ala. 1971) a standardized test given by the police department as a precondition
to promotion was upheld as being job-related.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
46. Baker v. Municipal Separate School System, 329 F. Supp. 706, 721
(N.D. Miss. 1971). Here, a local board of education instituted a requirement
that all teachers seeking employment or retention in the school system which was
about to be desegregated obtain a minimum score of 1000 in the national teachers'
examination. In enacting the requirement, the board was aware that this requirement would have racially discriminatory results. The court decided the case on
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The decision of the second circuit in Chance47 is similarly illustrative of

this equal protection approach and of the relationship between the
standards of Title VII in the private sector and the requirements of
equal protection in the public sector. Initially, the court concedes that the
actions of the Board of Examiners involve neither intentional racial dis-

4s
crimination nor racially neutral practices applied discriminatorily.
However, these two possibilities do not exhaust the protection against
4
racial discrimination afforded by the fourteenth amendment: 1

As already indicated, the district court found that the Board's examinations have
a significant and substantial discriminatory impact on [B]lack and Puerto Rican
applicants. That harsh racial impact, even if unintended, amounts to an invidious
de facto classification that cannot be ignored or answered with a shrug. At the
very least, the Constitution requires that state action spawning such classifications
be justified by legitimate state considerations. 50

After reviewing the evidence presented in the district court, the second
circuit agreed that a prima facie case of invidious discrimination had

been demonstrated. 5 Once having found such a classification, the burden of ultimate persuasion was shifted to the defendant to justify, at
least on the basis of job relatedness, the classification that it had
created.52 Since such a showing was not made, both the district court

and the court of appeals found that there was no error in granting an
injunction against the continued use of the test.58
Although the second circuit affirmed the district court's decision as
to discrimination, the court firmly rejected the use of the compelling
state interest test in this case:
According to the Board, the district court "clearly erred" in applying the compelling interest standard rather than the rational relationship test customarily
applied in equal protection cases.
Although state action invidiously discriminating on the basis of race has long
called for the "most rigid scrutiny" [citations omitted], the Supreme Court has yet
to apply that stringent test to a case such as this, in which the allegedly unconstitutional action Unintentionally resulted in discriminatory effects. . . . The
[district] court did not reach the issue whether--or even suggest that-if the
equal protection grounds and struck down the requirement as not being job-related.
47. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 1175.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1175-76 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 1176.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1178.
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written examination were job-related the Board would still be required to
demonstrate that no less discriminatory means of obtaining its supervisory personnel were available [citations omitted]. Had the [district] court done that, the
bite of the "compelling interest" test would apply.5 4

The equal protection approach of Chance is perhaps the most interesting
aspect of the decision and is fertile ground for rather extensive inquiry.
One small facet of the problem, however, and the one which most directly affects the Chance decision is the question of when the equal
protection clause requires the application of the compelling interest test.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,"e one of the major cases in the equal protection area, the Court dealt with a residency requirement for welfare
recipients. The Court struck down the residency requirement as an
infringement on the right to travel interstate:
But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.5 6

In Shapiro a compelling state interest was required because the right
restricted, i.e. the right to travel, was held to be fundamental. 7 Eisenstadt
54. Id. at 1177.
55. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56. Id. at 634.
57. Id. at 630-31. In Shapiro, the Court was confronted with statutes from the
states of Connecticut, Pennsylvania and from the District of Columbia which
created a one-year residency requirement for persons seeking to receive welfare benefits. The Court rejected the defendants' contention that the statute
sought to exclude persons seeking higher benefits, as well as the argument that the
waiting period helps the defendant-state in preparing the budget. Rather, the Court
found that the statute sought to deter the migration of indigents and was therefore, unconstitutional: "[Tihe purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents
cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting
period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. If a law has 'no other
purpose .

.

. than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those

who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.' (citations omitted]." Id. at 631. Here, obviously, the Court looked to the intent of the statute
and found that it created a classification which was intended to restrict the enjoyment of the fundamental right to travel. Id. at 638. Harper v. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966), demonstrates another facet of the problem. Here, the Court
was concerned with the constitutionality of a poll tax. After reaffirming the concept enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), that the right to vote
was fundamental, the Court struck down the poll tax as a violation of the equal
protection clause. In so doing the Court said: "We have long been mindful that
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection
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v. Baird,5 8 a recent Supreme Court decision in the equal protection area
and one relied on by the court of appeals in Chance, seemingly moves

in a different direction. Here, the Court was faced with a conviction
under a Massachusetts statute for distributing a contraceptive to an
unmarried woman during a birth control lecture.

9

The-Supreme Court

affirmed the granting of the habeas corpus petition, holding that the
statute violated the rights of single persons to -obtain contraceptives
under the equal protection clause." In discussing the requirements of
equal protection the Court said:
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not deny to the States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways [citations omitted]. The Equal Protection Clause of that
Amendment does, however, deny to the States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objectives of that statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.61

From this brief discussion of these two cases it might fairly be concluded that where the state is creating a classification outside of the area
of fundamental individual rights the equal protection clause does not
require that a compelling state interest be demonstrated. It is sufficient
thaf-the classification meet the less rigid standards of the Eisenstadt decision.
A further query remains as to intended racial classifications. In
Chance, the plaintiffs alleged that the examination was intended to create a racial classification. Both the district court and the court of appeals
rejected this contention:
The goal of the examination procedures should be to provide the best qualified
supervisors, regardless of their race, and if the examinations appear reasonably
constructive to measure knowledge, skills and abilities essential to a particular
62
position, they should not be nullified because of a de facto discriminatory impact.
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinied and carefully confined." Id. at 670 (citations omitted).
58. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
59. Id.at 440.
60. Id.at 443.
61. Id.at 446-47 (citations omitted).
62. 330 F. Supp. at 214. A question that should be asked iswhether or not
freedom from racial discrimination is a fundamental right. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is a sound basis for the exploration of this question.
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Nonetheless, on the facts of the case, the tests were shown to have a

definite racial impact:
Despite the splendidly motivated genesis of the Board of Examiners, its examinations ... have led to unintentional racial discrimination.,

The intent of the examination was allegedly to secure the best qualified
supervisory personnel, but its impact was found to be discriminatory,
and it was this impact which shifted the burden to the Board of Examiners to justify the examination as job-related. Although a discriminatory
classification was the net effect of the examination, the court determined
that the test could be justified under the equal protection clause if it was

shown to be job related-that is, if a rational basis could be demonstrated. Thus, while the racial impact was sufficient to compel a shifting
of the burden of ultimate persuasion from the plaintiffs to the Board of
Examiners, the non-discriminatory intent of the Board of Examiners

prevented the application of the compelling state interest test.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, amending Title VII
to include states and their sub-divisions has probably made cases of this
In overruling the doctrine of "separate but equal" the Court found separate educational facilities to be inherently unequal. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
a case involving segregation by the federal government in the schools of Washington, D.C., clarifies the Brown view of racial classifications. In negating such classifications the Court offered this view of their character: "Classifications based solely
upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our
traditions and hence Constitutionally suspect." Id. at 499. Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969) demonstrates the application of these concepts in another area.
This case involved an Akron, Ohio, municipal ordinance which required a majority vote by Akron's residents before an open housing ordinance could be enacted.
The Court held that the ordinance, "[d]iscriminates against minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of equal protection of the laws."
Id. at 393. The ordinance created a racial classification because the impact fell on
the minorities' right to be free from discrimination. Id. at 391. In holding such
discrimination to be violative of the equal protection clause, the Court said, "Because the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and
unjustified official distinctions based on race, racial classifications are 'constitutionally suspect,' . . .. and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny'. . . . They 'bear a
far heavier burden of justification' than other classifications." Id. at 391, 392 (citations omitted). In light of this judicial history it might be interesting to consider
what the Court would do in a situation where an employer used a test which had
demonstrable business necessity, but also produced discriminatory classifications, if
the employer had selected this test primarily for its discriminatory impact.
63. 458 F.2d at 1170.
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sort merely interesting bits of history. Undoubtedly, however, the rationale of the court and the application of the rational basis test to
discriminatory hiring practices will continue under the revised Title
VII as administered by the EEOC.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Candidate Filing Fees-Excessive Filing
Fees with No Alternative Means of Ballot Access Held Violative of Equal
Protection Clause. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Three potential candidates for local office brought suit to have their
names placed on the ballot in the Texas Democratic primary elections.'
Their suit was joined by a number of voters who wished to vote for
them.2 Two of the candidates met all of the qualifications for candidacy
in the primary except for their inability to pay the filing fees required
under Texas statutes.3
Plaintiffs contended that the fees were unconstitutional denials of due
process and equal protection which deprived them of their right to run
for office and to vote for the candidates of their choice.' A three judge
district court was convened and ordered that two of the candidates be
placed on the ballot without payment of the fees." A hearing on the
merits was subsequently granted in which the court held the Texas statutes to be unconstitutional violations of the first and fourteenth amendments. 6 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the
Texas statutes unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 7 The first amendment and due process issues
were not discussed.
The right to vote has been recognized as one of the most important
1. Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
2. 321 F. Supp. at 1360.

3. Id. The challenged statutes were Tex. Election Code Ann. arts. 13.07a,
13.08, 13.08a, 13.15, and 13.16 (1967). These statutes established filing fees in
primary elections for federal, state, local and political party offices.
4. 321 F. Supp. at 1360.
5. Id. The third candidate failed to notarize his application and submit
a loyalty oath. He was denied relief.
6. Id. at 1363.
7. 405 U.S. at 149.
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political rights.' In Reynolds v. Sims,9 the Supreme Court considered
the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice "the essence of a
democratic society."' 0 Restrictions on the right to vote "strike at the heart
of representative government."' 1 Infringement of this right in state elections is subject to judicial review under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 12 Because of the key role primary elections play
in the electoral process, statutes regulating them are considered to be
"state action" and therefore also subject to judicial review under the
equal protection clause.' 8
Although the right to vote is fundamental, there is no question that
states have the power to set reasonable qualifications on the franchise.
The right of suffrage "is subject to the imposition of state standards
which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed."' 4 Thus the state may establish age, residence, and even literacy
requirements for the right to vote.15 However, the payment of any fee or
tax as a condition upon the right of the franchise was held to be "invidious discrimination" in violation of the equal protection clause in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections.'" In delivering the opinion of the Court,

Mr. Justice Douglas declared that "[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color,
is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process.... To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a
voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor."' 7
The right to vote for the candidate of one's choice is not necessarily
the same as the right to appear on the ballot as a candidate. It was not
until Williams v. Rhodes' s that the Supreme Court recognized the
power of judicial review in right to candidacy cases.' 9 In Williams the
8. "[I]t is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative
of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. Id. at 555.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 566.
13. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 374-75, 379 (1963); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927). See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313"U.S. 299 (1941).
14. Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
15. Id. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
16. 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
17. Id. at 668.
18. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

19. Id. at28,
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Court invalidated the "highly restrictive provisions" 20 of the state of Ohio
which made it virtually impossible for a slate of presidential electors
pledged to George Wallace to get on the Ohio ballot.2 ' In the opinion of
the Court the burdens placed on access to the ballot by the Ohio laws
violated two different rights. First was "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs .... ,"2 This first amendment
freedom is protected against state infringement under the fourteenth
amendment.2 3 Second was "the right of qualified voters, regardless of
their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. ' 24 The Court
found that the state failed to show any "compelling interest" to justify
the burdens on the right to vote and associate. 5
Once the door was opened to judicial review of the right to candidacy,
it was inevitable that burdens on that right such as requirements of property ownership, nominating petitions, and filing fees would be challenged.
In Turner v. Fouche,26 the Court held that the privilege of holding public
office may not be denied on the basis of classifications that violate federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.27 In this case, the requirement that one be an owner of real estate before he may be appointed to
the county board of education was held to be "invidious discrimination"
because there was no substantial interest that the requirement served.28
In Jenness v. Fortson,29 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute
requiring, as a condition of getting on the ballot, either a party primary
victory or submission of a nominating petition signed by at least five per
cent of the voters registered in the last general election.30 In distinguishing
this case from Williams, Mr. Justice Stewart noted the "open quality"'"
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id. at 24-26. For a summary of the legal obstacles, see id. at 25, n.1.
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 30-31 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)).
24. Id. at 30.

Id. at 31. See notes 51-59 infra, and accompanying text.
396 U.S. 346 (1970).
27. Id. at 362-63.
28. Id. at 363-64.
25.
26.

29. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
30. Id. at 433. It should be noted that the district court granted an injunction
against enforcement of a filing fee requirement of five per cent of the annual salary
of the office being sought on the grounds that it was a denial of equal protection.
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). No appeal was

taken against the injunction. 403 U.S. at 432.
31.

403 U.S. at 439.
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of the Georgia system and the absence of any procedural or substantive
limitations on write-in votes. 32 The Court recognized a legitimate state
interest in demanding "some preliminary showing of a significant modi-

cum of support before printing the name of a political organization's
candidate on the ballot-the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion,

deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general
election."-"

Soon after Williams, a number of federal courts were confronted with

the question of the constitutionality of candidate filing fees as a prerequisite for having one's name printed on the ballot.3 4 Two basically irreconcilable positions emerged."5 The first decision on the subject was
Jenness v. Little 6 where a three judge district court ruled that the denial

of ballot access for the inability to post a filing fee was "illegal and unconstitutional"3 7 where there was no other way to get on the ballot.3 8
Even though write-in ballots were allowed, the fees were impermissible
because "to force a candidate to seek election in this fashion is to throw

too many hurdles in his path solely because he is without funds to qual-

ify." 39 The contrary position was taken in Wetherington v. Adams,40

32. Id. at 434.
33. Id. at 442.
34. A number of prior challenges to candidate filing fees were made in state
courts on state constitutional grounds and the fees were generally upheld. See
Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 864 (1963).
35. Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165, 167 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
36. 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom.,
Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). Cases generally following the reasoning
of this case are: Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Duncantell
v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Socialist Workers Party
v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179
(S.D. Ala. 1970); Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035
(N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431 (1971).
37. 306 F. Supp. at 929. The court did not precisely state the constitutional
grounds for its decision, although it appears to have relied on Harper. See notes
16-17 supra, and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970). Cases generally following Wetherington are: Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla.), motion for leave to
file petition for writ of mandamus denied, 402 U.S. 971 (1971), judgment vacated sub nom. Pope v. Haimowitz, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); Fowler v. Adams, 315
F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla.), injunction granted, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970), appeal
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
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where the constitutionality of filing fees was upheld. The three judge
district court noted that it was legitimate for the state to impose a three
or even a five per cent of annual salary filing fee in order to limit the ballot to "serious, good-faith candidates."41 The court found that "[a] serious candidate for public office has traditionally attracted money for his
candidacy. The inability to pay a reasonable filing fee might indicate a
lack of potential political support for a person's candidacy."42 Furthermore, the inability to pay the fee was not a complete denial of candidacy
as the office-seeker could run as a write-in candidate.4" The court in
Wetherington distinguished the case from Jenness v. Little on the basis
4
of unspecified factual differences.
In Bullock v. Carter,45 the Supreme Court was faced with a number of
factual problems which were peculiar to the Texas statutes under challenge. The most significant of these was that the fees were strikingly high.
The fee for one of the plaintiffs amounted to $6,300 or 32 per cent of
the annual salary of the office sought.46 In the past, the filing fees had run
as high as $8,900 for some offices.47 This situation was, as the Court
pointed out, a natural consequence of placing the burden of paying the
administrative expenses of primary elections on the candidate rather than
on the governmental unit.4" The other distinguishing feature of the Texas
system was that although the filing fee had to be paid to get on the primary ballot, and write-in votes for all offices except county and precinct
party chairman were not permitted,49 a candidate might be placed on
the general election ballot if he filed a nominating petition.50
In reaching its decision the Court had to determine the proper standard of review in cases involving a restriction on ballot diccess. Over the
years the Court has developed two standards of review in equal protection cases. 51 One is the standard of restrained review which tests the rea41.

309 F. Supp. at 321.

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.at 320.
Id. at 322.

45.

405 U.S. at 134.

46.

Id. at 138 n.10.

47.

Id. at n.11.

48. Id. at 138-39. The Court also noted that filing fees fixed by statute for
statewide offices ranged from $50 to $1000. See Tex. Election Code Ann. arts.

1308, 13.08a, 13.16 (Supp. 1972).
49. Tex. Election Code Ann. art. 13.09(b) (Supp. 1972).
50. Id. art. 13.50 (1967).

51.

For a thorough discussion of the standards used in equal protection cases,
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sonableness and rationality of a state imposed classiiczation.52 Under this
test the constitutionality of the state statute is ptesumed and it will be upheld so long as the classification reasonably relates to a legitimate purpose.53 Failure to meet this standard is held to be "invidious discrimination. '54 The other more stringent standard of review is adopted where
suspect classifications are involved or where burdens are imposed on the
fundamental rights of citizens. 5 When this occurs, the classification becomes subject to close scrutiny58 and the presumption of constitutionality is eliminated.57 The burden of proof is placed on the state to demonstrate that the. classification is well-tailored to serve a "compelling" state
interest.58 If the burden-is-met tho Court will then balance the compelling
state interests with thefundamental individual interests.59
Chief Justice Burger,- in delivering- the opinion of the Court, determined-thathe stricter-standard of review should apply. Noting that the
right to vote was given fundamental status, he found that "the rights of
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters."60 Furthermore, the barriers erected by
the state gave the Texas system a "patently exclusionary character." 6' 1
Not only did it exclude from candidacy those lacking personal wealth or
affluent backers, but it was likely to have a differential impact on voters
because the limitations would be likely to "fall more heavily on the less
affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be unable to
pay, the large costs required by the Texas system."6 It appears then that
the more stringent standard of review for voting rights cases adopted in
see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as Developments).
52. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961).

53. Id.
54. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
55. Developments, note 51 supra, at 1088. Suspect classifications include those
based on race, lineage, alienage, and in some instances wealth. Id. at 1124.
56. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
57. Developments, supra note 51, at 1101. See, e.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
58. Developments, note 51 supra, at 1122. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 658-60 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Developments, note 51 supra, at 1122-23.
60. 405 U.S. at 143.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 144.
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Harper3 was invoked because of the Texas statutes' burdens on the fundamental right to vote and its unequal impact on the voters depending
on their wealth or economic status.'
Under this standard of review the state must show that it has compelling interests in making its classifications. The Court recognized the
state's contention that it has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot 5 and "an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent
candidacies." 6 Nevertheless, it found that filing fees of up to $8,900
were "extraordinarily ill-fitted" 67 to serve these goals because they tended
to exclude legitimate as well as frivolous candidates.6" In rejecting the
state's argument that it did not use the filing fees to exclude serious candidates because they could be placed on the general election ballot by
petition, the Court took notice of the fact that, in Texas, selection of the
Democratic party candidate is commonly tantamount to election;69 moreover, it was unreasonable to require "candidates and voters to abandon
their party afliations in order to avoid the burdens of the filing fees." 70
The Court flatly rejected the contention that there is a necessary state
interest in apportioning the cost of primary elections among the candidates for office.7 1 It pointed out that the cost of general elections is
spread among all of the voters and that "it is far too late to make out
a case that the party primary is such a lesser part of the democratic
72
process that its cost must be shifted away from the taxpayers generally.
Thus the Court determined that the state failed to justify its filing fee
system and held that the system resulted in a denial of equal protection
of the laws. 73 The Court emphasized that the features of the Texas
system which led to this result were: (1) the lack of reasonable alternative means of ballot access; and (2) the denial to voters of the oppor63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See notes 16-17 supra, and accompanying text.
405 U.S. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. and n.26.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
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tunity to vote for candidates who were not on the primary ballot because
74
of their inability to pay.
The immediate result of Bullock is the extension of the strict standard
of review to state legislation which restricts access to the ballot by potential candidates. This extension is based on the rights and interests of
voters rather than on any rights that the candidates themselves might
have. In short, the Court in Bullock was unwilling to rule that political
candidacy is a fundamental right. This is consistent with other access
5
to ballot cases that have come before the Court.7
It seems clear, however, that the real significance of Bullock will be
the presentation to the Court of even more challenges to filing fees in the
near future. Rather than rule directly on the issue of the constitutionality
of filing fees,7 the Court merely held that the Texas system was "patently
exclusionary" and in violation of fourteenth amendment rights of equal
protection. The Court cautioned that "nothing herein is intended to cast
doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees
in other contexts. '7 7 No hint was given as to how to determine the reasonableness of a filing fee system.
Without explanation, the Court completely ignored the first amendment arguments that figured so prominently in Williams78 and in the
decision of the lower court in Bullock.7 ' Notable also was the Court's unfortunate distinction between thc inability and unwillingness to pay the
filing fees.80 With only passing reference to a dissent in Harper,-" the
Court indicated that "[t]here may well be some rational relationship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the seriousness
74. Id.
75. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 440 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968). See notes 18-25, 29-33 supra, and accompanying text.
76. A decision declaring them unconstitutional has been urged by some commentators. See Comment, The Emerging Right to Candidacy in State and Local
Elections: Constitutional Protection of the Voter, the Candidate, and the Political
Group, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 1543 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 558 (1972).
77. 405 U.S. at 149.
78. See notes 18-25 supra, and accompanying text.

79.
80.

See notes 1-6 supra, and accompanying text.
405 U.S. at 146.

81.

"[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll

tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about
public affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise."
383 U.S. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority
opinion see notes 16-17 supra, and accompanying text.
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with which he takes his candidacy.... ,82 This contention that the willingness to pay filing fees may be a rational way to weed out frivolous
candidates surely cannot withstand rigorous analysis. Even allowing for
the ability to pay, it can be argued that the sacrifice made by a relatively
poor candidate paying a "reasonable" filing fee may significantly exceed

the sacrifice made by his wealthier opponent. While the Court may well
rule that such differential burdens are tolerable, it would be a mistake to

assume that they are in any way a measure of seriousness. 83
It is likely then that in the very near future the Court will be called
84
upon to expand and explain its limited holding in Bullock.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection-Durational Residence
Requirements for Voting in State Elections Violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330

(1972).
Respondent moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employ-

ment as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University. In order
to vote in the August and November elections he attempted to register
with the county registrar. Under Tennessee law,' only those persons who
82. 405 U.S. at 145-46.
83. "Is a 'serious' candidate one who is able to expend a good deal of money
on his campaign? If so, this is unacceptable as a standard. The wealth of the individual candidate is too cynical a test to be applied to the legitimacy of his effort.
A poor man may be as 'serious' in his campaign as a wealthy one, and he has the
right to seek office with or without a capital outlay." Thomas v. Mims, 317 F.
Supp. 179, 182 (S.D. Ala. 1970). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972),
which was decided only the day prior to Bullock. There the Court was unpersuaded by the argument that a double-bond requirement would screen out frivolous appeals because "it not only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford
the bond." Id. at 78. For a discussion of some of the other arguments concerning
this issue, see Note, The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 Mich. L.
Rev. 558, 579-80 (1972).
84. In fact, the Supreme Court has been asked to hear another challenge to a
candidate filing fee. See Brown v. Chote, cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S.
Oct. 17, 1972) (-No. 71-1583).
1. Article IV § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: "Right to voteElection precincts-Military duty.-Every person of the age of twenty-one years,
being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for twelve months,
and of the county wherein such person may offer to vote for three months, next
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have been residents of the State for a year and residents of the county for

three months are allowed to vote in state elections. As a result, respondent was not allowed to register.
After he exhausted administrative remedies, respondent brought suit.
A three judge federal court held that Tennessee's durational residence

requirements were unconstitutional since they interfered with the right
to vote and created a "suspect" classification penalizing some Tennessee
residents because of recent interstate movements. 2
The United States Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision8 affirmed the decision of the lower court concluding that Tennessee did not offer an adequate justification for its durational residence laws.
Ever since the decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,5 the Supreme Court

has recognized that the right to vote is a fundamental political right "because [it is] preservative of all rights."' In 1964, the Court in Reynolds v.
preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for electors for President
and Vice-President of the United. States, members of the General Assembly and
other civil officers for the county or district in which such person resides; and
there shall be no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage.
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote in
the election precincts in which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of
elections and the purity of the ballot box. .. .

."

Section 2-201 of the Tenn. Code

Ann. provides: "Qualification of voters.-Every person of the age of twenty-one
(21) years, being a citizen of the United States and a resident of this state for
twelve (12) months, and of the county wherein he may offer his vote for three (3)
months next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for members
of the general assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which
he may reside." Section 2-304 of the Tenn. Code Ann. provides: "Persons entitled
to permanently register-Required time for registration to be in effect prior to
election.-All persons qualified to vote under existing laws at the date of application for registration . . . who will have lived in the state for twelve (12)

months

and in the county for which they applied for registration for three (3) months by
the date of the next succeeding election shall be entitled to permanently register
as voters under the provisions of this chapter provided, however, that registration
or reregistration shall not be permitted within thirty (30) days of any primary or
general election provided for by statute ...

"

Both of these statutory sections are

slated for repeal, effective Jan. 15, 1973.
2. Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd sub
nom., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
3. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Mr. Chief Justice Burger dissented; Mr. Justice Powell
and Mr. Justice Rhenquist took no part in the decision.
4. Id. at 360.

5. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
6.

Id. at 370.
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Sims7 reaffirmed that the right to vote is fundamental. In the instant case

the Court specifically found that durational residence requirements deny
a certain class of the population the right to vote,8 raising the constitutional question of whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment permits a state to discriminate in this way among its citizens. 9
Traditionally, laws challenged under the equal protection clause had
to meet a test of "reasonableness." 10 In Dunn, the State of Tennessee
based its argument on the decision in Drueding v. Devlin" which was

decided under that traditional equal protection standard. 12 In Drueding,
plaintiffs challenged sections of the Maryland Constitution which established residence requirements for voting in elections for the President
and Vice-President of the United States. The district court concluded
7. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society." Id. at 561-62.
8. "Durational residence laws penalize those persons who have traveled from
one place to another to establish a new residence during the qualifying period.
Such laws divide residents into two classes, old residents and new residents, and
discriminate against the latter to the extent of totally denying them the opportunity
to vote." 405 U.S. at 334-35 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. This type of discrimination, based on durational residence requirements,
has disenfranchised millions of voters. See Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 477 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Cocanoweri;
Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights,
38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 93 (1969); Note, Residence Requirements for Voting in
Presidential Elections, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1970).
10. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court
established certain rules which clarified the "reasonableness" standard. "The rules
by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this
court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids
what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely
arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the tine the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary." Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted). See also Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522 (1959); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
11. 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
12. 234 F. Supp. at 725.
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that the statutes in question did not amount to any irrational or unreasonable discrimination.1 3 However, the Supreme Court in Dunn was

quick to point out that the test used in Drueding can no longer be applied
when considering any statute which places a condition on the exercise
of the right to vote. 1 4 Having rejected the "reasonableness" test of Drue-

ding, the Court concluded that the state must show a "substantial and
compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements." 5
The "compelling state interest" test had been used in a number of

cases relating to the right to vote.' 6 Essentially, the test is applied to state
statutes in two different categories, those which are "inherently suspect"' 7
and those which involve rights that are considered fundamental.' 8 In
9 the Supreme Court reKramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,1
2
jected the old standard of reasonableness. Kramer, a bachelor, was
denied the right to vote in a school district election because he had no
children and did not own any taxable property within the district. The
majority in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to vote, based its
13. "The several states may impose age, residence and other requirements, so
long as such requirements do not discriminate against any class of citizens by reason of race, color or other invidious ground and are not so unreasonable as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 723 (footnote omitted).
14. 405 U.S. at 337. The unpopularity of the Drueding test was pointed out
by Mr. Justice Marshall: "It seems to me clear that Drueding is not good law today." Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 52 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. 405 U.S. at 335.
16. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. For examples of classifications which are considered "inherently suspect"
see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (political allegiance); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (wealth).
18. See, e.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal procedure); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation). See generally Developments in the L.aw.---Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969).
19. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). For a full discussion of the emergence of the "compelling state interest" standard see Cocanower 487-503.
20. "Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents
the right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a 'rational basis' for the distinction made are not applicable." 395 U.S.
at 627-28 (footnote omitted).
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decision on the "compelling state interest" test,21 and did not consider
state durational residence requirements,2 2 whose validity was conceded
by the appellant.
In Cipriano v. City of Houma,2 s the Court applied the "compelling
state interest" test in rejecting the constitutionality of a state statute which
only allowed property taxpayers to vote in municipal bond elections. The
same reasoning was used in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski24 where

the issue involved general obligation bonds rather than revenue bonds.
The decisions in Kramer, Cipriano, City of Phoenix and other recent

cases 25 where state statutes have disenfranchised some voters clearly indicate acceptance of the "compelling state interest" test in cases involving
the fundamental right to vote.
Although the Court in Dunn concluded that durational residence requirements do not meet the "compelling state interest" test, the Court
continued to emphasize the difference between bona fide residence requirements and durational residence requirements. 26 In Pope v. Williams,27 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which
required that new arrivals in the state make a declaration of intent to
become citizens one year before they registered to vote.28 Although sev-

eral cases have cited Pope as authority for requiring durational resi21. See note 19 supra.
22.

"At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case....

Appellant agrees that the States have the power to impose reasonable citizenship,
age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot." 395 U.S. at 625
(emphasis omitted).
23. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
24. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, (1970); Harper v. Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'n, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), the "compelling
state interest" test was not used. McDonald involved an action by inmates of a
county jail who were denied the right to cast absentee ballots. Chief Justice Warren concluded that: "Such an exacting approach is not necessary here, however,
for two readily apparent reasons. First, the distinctions made by Illinois' absentee
provisions are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race. Secondly, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote." Id. at 807.
26. 405 U.S. at 343.
27. 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
28. "In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of
the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to
it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 632.
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dence,29 the majority in Dunn preferred to give Pope a narrow reading,

indicating that the case "simply stands for the proposition that a State
may require voters to be bona fide residents." 30

In addition to denying one class of residents the right to vote, the
Court in Dunn concluded that "the durational residence requirement
directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right,
the right to travel."' Although the Constitution does not specifically
speak of a right to travel, the Court in several decisions has recognized

that the right to travel is a fundamental right. 2 As a result, any statute
which seeks to impinge on that right must meet the "compelling state in-

terest" test." Moreover, in passing the Federal Voting Rights Act of
29. See, e.g., Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971);
Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Drueding v. Devlin,
234 F.Supp. 721 (D. Md.1964).
30. 405 U.S. at 337, n. 7. "Carefully read, that case simply holds that federal
constitutional rights are not violated by a state provision requiring a person who
enters the State to make a 'declaration of his intention to become a citizen before
he can have the right to be registered as a voter and to vote in the State.' " Id. n.
7, quoting Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 634 (1904) (emphasis omitted). Mr.
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Dunn expressed his disagreement
with the majority's reading of Pope: "I cannot so blithely explain Pope v. Williams
away, as does the Court . . . by asserting that if that opinion is '[clarefully read,'
one sees that the case was concerned simply with a requirement that the new arrival declare his intention. The requirement was that he make the declaration a
year before he registered to vote; time as well as intent was involved. For me,
therefore, the Court today really overrules the holding in Pope v. Williams and
does not restrict itself, as footnote 7 says, to rejecting what it says are mere dicta."
405 U.S. at 361-62 (emphasis omitted). Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting
opinion argued that Pope is "as valid today as it was at the turn of the century."
Id. at 363.
31. Id. at 338.
32. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Shapiro V. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the Court
observed that: "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce
in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union."
383 U.S. at 757. Chief Justice Taney once remarked that: "For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one
common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the
same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it
without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 282, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). See generally Z. Chafee, Three
Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 185 (1956 ed.).
33. 405 U.S. at 341-42.
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1970,14 Congress concluded that durational residence requirements for

voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections do not serve any
35
compelling state interest.
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 6 the Court found that state statutes which
imposed a one-year waiting period for interstate migrants as a condition
to receiving welfare benefits were unconstitutional 7 While Shapiro did

not decide the validity of durational residence requirements as applied
to voting, 8 the Court in Dunn concluded that ".... Shapiro and the compelling state interest test it articulates control this case." 9 Petitioner at-

tempted to distinguish Shapiro by arguing that durational residence
requirements for voting neither attempt to deter nor in fact do deter

travel. 40 The Court rejected this argument:
It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent
deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actu34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa 1(a)-(6) (1970).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa 1(a)(1)-(6) provides: "Residence requirements for
voting-Congressional findings. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the imposition
and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections
-(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for
their President and Vice President; (2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines; (3) denies
or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens of each State
under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution; (4) in some instances
has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote for
such officers because of the way they may vote; (5) has the effect of denying to
citizens the equality of civil rights, and due process and equal protection of the
laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and (6) does
not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct
of presidential elections."
36. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
37. "But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be neccessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634 (citation and emphasis
omitted).
38. "We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, [or] eligibility for tuition-free education ...
Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis omitted).
39. 405 U.S. at 339. For a viewpoint that concludes that voting residence
requirements may not violate the right to travel see Note, Shapiro v. Thompson:
Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 989, 1005-08 (1969).
40. 405 U.S. at 339.
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ally deterred travel. Nor have other "right to travel" cases in this Court always
4
relied on the presence of actual deterrence. '

It was the determination that the classification involved actually penalized the right to travel which led the Court in Shapiro to use the "com42
pelling state interest" test.
Having decided that durational residence laws must be measured by
a strict equal protection test, the Court in Dunn examined whether Tennessee had shown that its residence requirements furthered a sufficiently
substantial state interest. The interests put forth by the state of Tennessee,
namely, purity of the ballot box and knowledgeable voters, were rejected

by the Court.4" Today, purity of the ballot box is usually maintained by
a system of voter registration, 44 where a resident establishes his qualifications by oath.45 As a result, the durational residence requirement adds

nothing to a simple residence requirement (i.e. one which requires bona
fide residency) in the effort to stop fraud and "becomes an effective
voting obstacle only to residents who tell the truth and have no fraudulent purposes. ' '4 The argument by Tennessee is further dissipated by the
fact that there are two separate waiting periods, one year for the state
and ninety days for the county.4 7 In addition, the Court pointed out
that Tennessee has several criminal statutes capable of deterring voter
fraud.4 8

The "knowledgeable voters" argument involves three separate claims,49
each of which was rejected by the Court.
41. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
42. 394 U.S. at 634.
43. 405 U.S. at 345-60. For a list of six state interests that may be advanced
by durational residence requirements see Cocanower, supra note 9, at 495-503.
44. Most states have voter registration laws. See, e.g., Cocanower, supra note
9, at 477, 499; Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and
Civil Rights, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 93, 96-97 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-309 (1971).
46. 405 U.S. at 346-47. It is undisputed that Blumstein was a bona fide resident.
of the state and county when he attempted to register. Id. at 347.
47. The Court in Dunn concludes that: "It is impossible to see how both could
be 'necessary' to fulfill the pertinent state objective. If the State itself has determined that a three-month period is enough time in which to confirm bona fide
residence in the State and county, obviously a one-year period cannot also be,
justified as 'necessary' to achieve the same purpose." Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-202, 2-324, 2-1614, 2-2207, 2-2208,
2-2209 (1971).
49. The first involves some surety that the voter has become a member of the
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There is simply nothing in the record to support the conclusive presumption that
residents who have lived in the State for less than a year and their county for less
than three months are uninformed about elections. 50

The immediate impact of the decision in Dunn is that the question of
the legitimacy of state durational residence requirements for voting has
been decided. 51 Previously, lower courts were divided on the question."
In both Shapiro and Dunn the -Court indicated that when a statute infringes upon the right to travel, the "compelling state interest" test will
be used to determine the constitutionality of the statute. 53 Furthermore
the Court in Dunn extended the "compelling state interest" test into the
area of durational residence requirements for voting. 54 The importance
community. The Court concludes that "this does not justify or explain the exclusion from the franchise of persons, not because their bona fide residence is questioned, but because they are recent rather than long-time residents." 405 U.S. at
354. The second element sought to assure that the voter " 'has a common interest
in all matters pertaining to [the community's] government ..
'" Id. A similar
argument was specifically rejected in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
The third element was "that a long-time resident is 'more likely to exercise his
right [to vote] more intelligently.'" 405 U.S. at 356. The Court concluded that
this goal is an "elusive one, and susceptible of abuse." Id.
50. Id. at 358.
51. The Court was to have decided the question in 1969 but the case was dismissed as moot. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
Hall, a six month residency requirement was upheld by the lower court. After the
appeal to the Supreme Court was initiated, the Colorado legislature reduced the
residency requirement for the presidential election from six months to two months.
Id. at 48.
52. Durational residence requirements were struck down in Andrews v. Cody,
327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (1 year); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380
(D. Mass. 1970) (1 year); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ind.
1970) (6 months); Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C.
1970) (1 year); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970) (1 year);
Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (6 months); Kohn v.
Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970) (1 year); Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F.
Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970) (6 months). Other courts have upheld durational residence requirements. Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971)
(6 months and 1 year); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss.
1971) (4 months); Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (1
year); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970) (1 year); Piliavin
v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (6 months).
53. 405 U.S. at 338-39. Cf. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Shapiro
v. Thompson in which he was concerned with this type of wide ranging judicial review and expressed the opinion that "suspect" classifications had been extended to
include any constitutional right. 394 U.S. at 658.
54. 405 U.S. at 335.
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of the extension of the "compelling state interest" test is noted by Mr.
Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion:
It is no more a denial of equal protection for a State to require newcomers to be
exposed to state and local problems for a reasonable period such as one year before voting, than it is to require children to wait 18 years before voting. In both
cases some informed and responsible persons are denied the vote, while others
less informed and less responsible are permitted to vote. Some lines must
be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state interest" standard is
to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this
seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands
nothing less than perfection. 55

It can be argued that the decision in Dunn will not be a precedent for
the extension of the "compelling state interest" test into other areas.
First, Dunn concerned itself with the right to vote, an area of concern
that was already being examined by Congress5" and by the Court.57 Second, the Court's logic in rejecting the arguments advanced by Tennessee
in favor of durational residence requirements for voting indicate that
those requirements were unnecessary and really served no purpose.5
Third, the Court in Shapiro had already extended the "compelling state
interest" test to an infringement on the right to travel, while Dunn involved both the right to travel and the right to vote.
At any rate it is clear that the decision in Dunn will be used by state
courts in striking down durational residence requirements for voting in
state elections. 9 Perhaps the best summary of the rationale in Dunn was
given by the New York Court of Appeals when it struck down a similar
residence requirement:
Broadly imposed political disabilities, such as those embodied in durational residency requirements belong to another day and under current standards are simply
too imprecise to withstand constitutional scrutiny.10

Whether other state statutes will be subjected to the "compelling state
55. Id. at 363-4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Indeed the only
cases where the "compelling state interest" test has been met involved national
rather than state interests. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
56. See note 34 supra.
57. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
58. See notes 45-47 supra.
59. See note 60 infra.
60. Atkin v. Board of Elections, 30 N.Y.2d 377, 379, 285 N.E.2d 687, 68889, 334 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1972) (citations omitted). The court held that the
N.Y. Const. art. II, § 1, and N.Y. Election Law § 150 (McKinney 1964) failed to
meet the "compelling state interest" test. Id. at 406, 285 N.E.2d at 689, 334
N.Y.S.2d al ,79.
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interest" test will depend upon whether the statute involved abridges a
fundamental right or is an inherently suspect classification. This in turn
ultimately becomes a matter for judicial interpretation. The present
members of the Court each have their own views as to what constitutes
a fundamental right. The three most "liberal" Justices on the CourtDouglas, Brennan, and Marshall-have shown a willingness to designate
rights as "fundamental rights." 1 Perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas has gone
as far as any Justice in determining what can be defined as a fundamental

right:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
62
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.

Mr. Justice Rhenquist, on the other hand, has indicated his reluctance
to extend the fundamental rights concept:
The difficulty with this approach, devoid as it is of any historical or textual support
in the language of the Equal Protection Clause, is that it leaves apparently to the
Justices of this Court the determination of what are, and what are not, "fundamental personal rights." . . . While the determination of the extent to which a
right is protected may result in the drawing of fine lines, the fundamental sanction
to the right itself is found in the language of the Constitution, and not elsewhere.
The same is unfortunately not true of the doctrine of "fundamental personal
as a
rights." This body of doctrine created by the Court can only be described
63
judicial superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution itself.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger has also indicated his reluctance to define "fun'64

damental rights," or to use the "compelling state interest test." Mr. Justice Stewart, while reluctant to characterize certain human activities as
"fundamental," has shown a willingness to use the "compelling state interest" test when a statute infringes on an "established constitutional

right."
61. For examples of Mr. Justice Brennan's views see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 229 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 330 (1972). Mr. Justice Marshall also concurred with Mr. Justice
Brennan in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Griswold, the
executive director and the medical director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut gave information, instruction and medical advice to married persons
concerning contraception. This was in violation of a Connecticut statute which
forbade the use of contraceptives. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional since it violated the right of privacy of married couples. Id. at 481-86.
63. Weber v. Aetna Casualty, 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972).
64. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. See also his dissenting opinion
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 465 (1972).
65. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Mr. Justice Stewart agreed
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Mr. Justice White has adopted a somewhat pragmatic approach toward the question of what constitutes a fundamental right. 6 He has indicated that when "sensitive areas of liberty" are involved, a strict constitutional standard must be applied. 7 Mr. Justice Blackmun, while
hesitant to define what is meant by a fundamental right, has also adopted
a pragmatic approach similar to that of Mr. Justice White.88
Although he has only been on the Court for a short period, Mr. Justice
Powell has indicated that the Court can decide what is meant by a fundamental right. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty,89 the petitioner's deceased
common law husband was killed in the course of his employment. His
wife was in a mental hospital, and the decedent had been living with the
petitioner, his four legitimate children and his two illegitimate children.
The question concerned the right of the dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate children to recover under a Louisiana workman's compensation law on an equal footing with their natural father's legitimate children. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell noted that:
that the "compelling state interest" test should be used when the right to travel
has been infringed upon: "The Court today does not 'pick out particular human
activities, characterize them as 'fundamental' and give them added protection . .. .'
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself
demands." Id. at 642 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). But cf. his dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530: "With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other
part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court." (footnote omitted).
66. See note 67 infra.
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., concurring). Mr. Justice White took a pragmatic approach toward the statute involved.
He believed that Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples did not in any way reinforce the State's ban on illicit sexual relationships. Id.
at 505. This pragmatic approach was also reflected in his concurring opinion in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 460-65 (1972) (White, J., concurring). In Eisenstadt, the appellant was convicted for exhibiting contraceptive articles during a
lecture, and for giving a young woman a package of vaginal foam at the close of his
address. While recognizing that some contraceptives can be dangerous and should
only be dispensed by those authorized to do so, Mr. Justice White concluded that:
"Nothing in the record even suggests that the distribution of vaginal foam should
be accompanied by medical advice in order to protect the user's health." Id. at 464.
68. See, e.g., his opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty, -406 U.S. 164,
171 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred with the
opinion of Mr. Justice White in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. at 460-65 (1972),
and with the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
530 (1970).
69. 4,06 U.S. 164 (1972).
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The essential inquiry . . . is . . . inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the
classification endanger?"O
The opinions of the various members of the Court indicate that a majority of the present Justices are willing to broaden the concept of funda-

mental rights, automatically extending the "compelling state interest"
test into these areas. Despite the factual limitations in the instant case, it
seems likely that the Court will broaden its concept of fundamental

rights. However, the question of what particular rights will be classified
as fundamental cannot be answered with any degree of certainty.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State Statute Granting Juvenile Court
Proceedings to Female Defendants Under the Age of Eighteen but Limit.
ing Such Proceedings to Male Defendants Under the Age of Sixteen Held
Violative of Equal Protection Clause. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18
(16th Cir. 1972).

Appellant, Danny Ray Lamb, when seventeen years of age, burglarized 1 an automobile, for which felony2 he was tried and convicted as an

adult. An Oklahoma statute required juvenile court proceedings for persons who were children at the time of their alleged offense.3 Children
were defined as males under sixteen years of age and females under eigh70.

-

Id. at 167.

1. "Every person who breaks and enters any building or any part of any building, room, booth, tent, railroad car, automobile, truck, trailer, vessel or other
structure or erection, in which any property is kept, or breaks into or forcibly
opens, any coin operated or vending machine or device with intent to steal any
property therein or to commit any felony, is guilty of burglary in the second
degree." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1435 (Supp. 1972).
2. Burglary in the second degree, because it is a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for at least two years, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1436
(1958), is a felony as defined in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 5 (1958).
3. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1112(a) (Supp. 1972) provides in part: "a
child who is charged with having violated any State statute or municipal ordinance
shall not be tried in a criminal action, but in a juvenile proceeding in accordance
with this Act. If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal charge
against any person, it shall be ascertained that the person was a child at the time
of committing the alleged offense, the court shall transfer the case, together with
all the papers, documents and testimony connected therewith, to the juvenile division of the court."
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teen years of age.4 On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, appellant argued that the statute denying him a juvenile court
proceeding because of his age, but which would have granted such a proceeding to a female of the same age, violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' That court upheld appellant's conviction
and the statute's constitutionality.' Appellant, again arguing that the statute denied him the equal protection of the laws, next sought a writ of
habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma. Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, the federal
district court upheld the statute's constitutionality,_and denied appellant
the relief sought. 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower federal court's decision, and held
for the appellant, declaring the Oklahoma statute violative of the equal
8
protection clause.

4. Law of May 3, 1968, ch. 282, § 101(a), [1968] Okla. Laws 444. A child is
now defined as "any person under the age of eighteen (18) years." Okla. Stat. Ann.

tit.

10, § 1101 (a) (Supp. 1972). Thus, if a seventeen year old male were to bur-

glarize an automobile today in Oklahoma, he would have the benefits of(a juvenile
court proceeding, The change came too late to aid defendant Lamb who committed
his offense on August 3, 1969.
5. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
6. Lamb v. State, 475 P.2d 829. (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
7. Lamb v. Brown, No. 71-C-63 (N.D. Okla., May 21, 1971).
8. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972). Ensuing decisions of Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals, applying Lamb v. Brown, made appellant
Lamb's victory in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Pyrrhic
as to defendants of like age and opposite sex. Schaffer v. Green, 496 P.2d 375
(Okla. Crim. App. 1972) interpreted the federal decision as holding the 1968
statute unconstitutional in toto. The court next went on to declare unconstitutional a later Oklahoma statute (Law of April 15, 1970, ch. 226, § 2, [1970] Okla.
Laws 370 (repealed 1972)), which contained provisions similar to the 1968 law.
The court then determined that Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 152 (1958), which
stated that a child under seven years of age was incapable of committing a crime,
and that a child over seven years of age and under fourteen years of age is
capable of committing a crime if he knew of the act's wrongfulness, was the applicable statute in, defining.a .child for the purpose of granting a juvenile court
proceeding. Thus, the highest age at which one could get a juvenile court proceeding was fourteen. The situation was rectified by the passage of Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 1101(a) (Supp. 1972), which defined a child as a person under
eighteen years of age. In light of § 1101 (a) which went into effect on April 4, 1972,
at 4:00 p.m., Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), held
that if a person committed a crime before 4:00 p.m. of April 4, 1972, and was
nct yct fourteen years of age at the time the alleged act was committed, he was to
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In applying the equal protection clause, the United States Supreme
Court has utilized two approaches.' The first is the reasonable purpose
have a hearing to determine if he knew of the wrongfulness of his act, and if it

were decided that he knew of the wrongfulness of his act, he would get a juvenile
court proceeding. If a person were over fourteen years of age, he would be treated
as an adult.
It is interesting to note that the judge who wrote the Freshour decision and
concurred in the Schaffer decision was the same judge who, before his appointment to the Court of Criminal Appeals in January 1972, sentenced the defendant. In sentencing Danny Ray Lamb, Judge Robert D. Simms of the
District Court of Tulsa County rejected the defense attorney's argument that the
statute denying juvenile court proceedings to males between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen was unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. There is a question as to whether Judge Simms, as an
appellate judge, should have disqualified himself, under Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 20,
§ 1402 (Supp. 1972), from similar cases involving nominally different 16-18 year
olds.
Arguments can be made to show that the Court of Criminal Appeals's application of Lamb v. Brown is not necessarily correct. The issue before the United
States Court of Appeals was the unconstitutionality of excluding 16-18 year old
males from juvenile court proceedings. On remand from the court of appeals, the
federal district court decided to vacate Lamb's conviction, apparently interpreting
the higher court's decision as elevating 16-18 year old males to the same status as
like-aged females. Lamb v. Brown, No. 71-C-63 (N.D. Okla., April 20, 1972).
The Supreme Court, when finding a statute repugnant to the equal protection
clause, has usually elevated a previously unfavored group, and not struck down a
previously favored group. Thus, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), where a
statute which favored the granting of letters of administration to males was held
violative of equal protection, males were not to be disfavored as were females,
but females were to be favored as were males. But in Reed the Court had no
choice but to elevate a previously unfavored group, for to do otherwise would
mean that no one would be able to be administrators. In Reed the choice was
either to grant letters of administration to males and females on an equal basis
or to grant no letters of administration. Since the latter alternative would have been
untenable, the Court had to accept the former. But, it is possible to cure a statute
by lowering a previously favored group to the same level as a previously unfavored group. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
where a statute to sterilize some criminals of one class was declared unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court gave the Oklahoma Supreme Court the
choice of either enlarging the group to include all criminals of one class, i.e.,
lowering a previously favored group, or contracting the group, i.e., raising a
previously unfavored group. It can be said, therefore, that the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeal decisions and the district court's decision were permissible, but
the latter's decision was the far more humane.
9. For a discussion of the application of the equal protection clause see Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949),
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test, 10 which, as applied to equal protection, is premised on the belief
that states are unable to function well without some classification of -their
citizens." The Court defers to the legislature, allowing it to judge a local
situation and make distinctions accordingly, but the distin~tion must 'admit of a reasonable construction consistent with a legitimate governmental goal.1" The classification or distinction drawn.by the legislature
is presumed to be constitutionally valid.' Thus, a party who challenges
the classification's constitutionality has the burden of proof,' 4 which -he
may meet by showing either that the 1urpose of the statute is not founded
upon a permissible state interest, 15 or that the classification is not reasonably related to the statute's purpose.' In either case, the Court -will
determine the statute's purpose, which may be ascertained from the statu-.
tory language, but, if that proves unenlightening, the Court will look .at
"general public knowledge about the evil sought to be remedied, prior
law, accompanying legislation, enacted statements of purpose, formal
public pronouncements, and internal legislative history."1 7 The purpose
need not be specific; a general purpose will suffice.' 8 The Court, under
the reasonable purpose approach, will accept any reasonably conceivable
purpose which is able to support the presumption of constitutionality. 9
To be held unconstitutional the classification has to be "palpably arbi20

trary."

The second approach is the "compelling state interest" test.2 ' Here,

which was updated by Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
10. See generally Developments, supra note 9, at 1077-87.
11. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1947); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
12. See, e.g., Reed Y. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
13. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
14. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79-80 (1911).
15. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
16. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
17. Developments, supra note 9, at 1077 (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
19. Id. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215 (1914).
21. See generally, Developments, supra note 9, at 1087-132. An example of
compelling state interest is national defense in time of war. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Besides compelling state interests, the courts speak,
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there is no presumption of constitutional validity. 22 The state has the
burden of proving that the classification is related to some overriding
state purpose, 23 i.e., the classification "must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective.

' 24

Reasonable-

ness is not enough. The Court will not be inclined to accept any purpose;
the purpose must be specific. 2 The classification will be subjected to
"strict scrutiny. '2 6 The "compelling state interest" test is used, however,
only when the statute under review affects "fundamental interests" or is
based on "suspect classifications." The Supreme Court has included as
"fundamental interests" voting27 and procreation .2 s Race 29 and national
ancestry3 ° are at least two "suspect classifications." In those equal protection cases where the Supreme Court has applied the "compelling state
interest," test, it has often found invidious discrimination. In Carrington
v. Rash,31 the Court held that the provision of the Texas Constitution
denying servicemen stationed in Texas the right to vote in state elections
was an invidious discrimination against servicemen who were bona fide
residents of Texas. There the fundamental interest of voting had been
abridged, and the related discrimination invidious.
In dealing with sex discrimination, the courts, until recently, have
generally not decided the issues before them with detachment. Two law
professors write:
[Bly and large the performance of American judges in the area of sex discriminafrequently in areas other than equal protection, of permissible state interests,
examples of which are protection of the young from obscenity, Ginsburg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and discouragement of extra-marital sex, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1964) (concurring opinion). Permissible
state interest may be spoken of in equal protection cases utilizing the reasonable
purpose test, for a state presumably will have a purpose in enacting a statute.
22. Kramer v. School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969); Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
23. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
24. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). There
are areas outside of equal protection where the Court will carefully scrutinize a
statute. These areas include first amendment rights, McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 449 (1960), and those within the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1964) (concurring opinion).
27. See, e.g., Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
28. See Skinner v Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 11942).
29 See. e.g. Mcl aughlin v. Florida, 179 1 S. 184 1964)
30. See Korematsu v United States. "23 1) S 214 1944)
31, 380 US,89 (1965)
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tion can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable. With some
notable exceptions, they have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those
judicial virtues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served
them so well with respect to other sensitive social issues. 82

True, the above conclusion was drawn from cases concerned in the main
with discrimination against women, but it is the principles set up in those
cases which will be applied to other sex discrimination cases, including
sex discrimination against men. In thepast, courts were reluctant to hold
that sex discrimination violated equal protection of the laws. The question presented itself: would courts continue to be so reluctant, and if not,
which test Would they apply? The Supreme Court, deciding this issue in
1971,11 was confronted with two alternatives.
The first alternative was to apply the reasonable purpose test to sex
discrimination cases, continuing a practice which was last seen in Goesaert v. Cleary.8 4 In that case, the Court examined a Michigan statute"
which limited the licensing of bartenders to males and to the wives and
daughters of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. The
.petitioners argued that to allow some women the opportunity to become
barmaids, but to deny that opportunity to other women was a violation
of equal protection.8 The Court gave short shrift to petitioners' contention, stating in a nebulous way:
Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise
to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the
legislature neednot go to the full length of prolfibition if it believes that as to a
defined grouip of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or
reduce the moral add social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.3 7

The decision,' an example of restrained review, 8 utilized the reasonable
purpose test in applying the equal protection clause. The Court was
satisfied, by finding that the purpose of the statute under review was to
•prevent "moral 'and- social problems" from arising. It did not question
what these problems were. The petitioners failed to overcome the pre32. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1971).
33. Reed v.Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
34. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
35. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.990(1) (Supp. 1947).
36. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
37. Id. at 466.
38. In Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), the
Court, in an extreme example of restrained review, said that nepotism in the
selection of river pilots may be intended to promote public safety.
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sumption of the statute's constitutionality by failing to show that the
purpose of the statute was not a legitimate goal, and that the classification was not reasonably related to the statute's purpose. The Court, in

effect, accepted a phrase of little substance and called it a purpose with
which to deny a significant portion of Michigan's population an employment opportunity.
The second alternative, the "compelling state interest" test, was utilized by the California Supreme Court in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby.89 The

statute in question prohibited women from serving as barmaids except
when they were licensees, wives of licensees, or were, singly or with their
husbands, the sole shareholders of a corporation holding a license. Among
other grounds, the petitioners attacked the statute as violative of the equal
protection clause. The court applied the "compelling state interest" test.
First, it held "[t]he right to work and the concomitant opportunity to

achieve economic security and stability are essential to the pursuit of
life, liberty and happiness,"4 and are thus fundamental interests. In so
holding, the court quoted the United States Supreme Court: "the right

to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of [the Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."' The court next
held that sex was a suspect classification. Justice Peters, writing for a
unanimous court, reasoned:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into which the class
members are locked by the accident of birth. What differentiates sex from the
nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with
the recognized suspect classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or to contribute to society. The result is that
the whole class is relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or characteristics of its individual members....
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifications is the stigma of
inferiority and second class citizenship associated with them. Women, like Negroes,
aliens, and the poor have historically labored under severe legal and social disabilities. Like black citizens, they were, for many years, denied the right to vote and,
from
until recently, the right to serve on juries in many states. They are excluded
42
or discriminated against in employment and educational opportunities.
39. 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
40. Id. at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
41. Id., 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339, quoting Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
42. 5 Cal. 3d at 18-19, 485 P.2d at 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41 (citations
omitted).
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Holding, therefore, that the statute under review affected a fundamental
interest and was based on a suspect classification, the court applied the
"compelling state interest" test. The compelling state interest alleged
was the protection of the public from improprieties and unwholesome
influences and was based upon two premises. The first rationale was "that
women who do not have an interest by way of ownership or marriage in
the liquor license will not be sufficiently restrained from committing
'improprieties.' ,,43 That reasoning was held to be arbitrary and illogical.
"There is no reason to believe that women bartenders would have any
less incentive than male bartenders to obey the laws governing the sale
of alcoholic beverages and the rules set down by their employers in
order to retain their jobs and promote their own well-being."' 44 The second rationale was "that women bartenders would be an 'unwholesome
influence' on young people and the general public. '45 This rationale
failed because California statutes "permit women to work as cocktail
waitresses, serve beer and wine from behind a bar, or tend bar if they
or their husbands hold a liquor license. 4 6
The challenge having been drawn, the Supreme Court decided in Reed
v. Reed47 not to apply the compelling state interest test to sex discrimination cases as Sail'erInn had done, but neither did it apply the reasonable
purpose test quite as Goesaert had. In Reed the Court was presented
with an Idaho statute that favored the appointment of men over women
as administrators of estates. 4 Richard Reed, a minor, died intestate. His
adopted mother petitioned an Idaho court to have herself named administratrix of her son's estate. Cecil Reed, Richard's adopted father,
who was estranged from his wife, also petitioned to be named administrator of his son's estate. The lower court, following the Idaho statute,
granted Cecil Reed's petition. On appeal, petitioner argued that the
statute violated the equal protection clause. The Court applied the reasonable purpose test.4 9 The purpose of the statute under review, as con43. Id. at 20, 485 P.2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
44. Id., 485 P.2d at 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
45. Id., 485 P.2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
46. Id. at 21,485 P.2d at 542, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (citation omitted).
47. 404U.S. 71 (1971).
48. Probate Practice Act, ch. 3, § 53, [1864] Idaho Laws 335 (repealed 1972).
49. Although the Court failed to apply the compelling state interest test, this
does not mean that future courts will not hold sex to be a suspect classification.
The Court in Reed had no reason to proceed beyond the reasonable purpose test.
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eluded by the Idaho Supreme Court ° and accepted by the United States
Supreme Court, was to reduce "the workload on probate courts by
eliminating a class of contests."'" Without going into details, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 2
If the Supreme Court had decided Reed utilizing a restrained review approach, it may well have concluded that the purpose was reasonable,
leaving it to the state legislature to decide how to grant letters of administration. But the days of restrained review seem to be over. The
presumption of a statute's constitutionality seems to have weakened. The
petitioner retains the burden of proof, but it does not seem as great as it
once did. In Goesaert, the Court was willing to accept a purpose couched
in meaningless words. In Reed, the Court refused to accept a purpose
of specific words. It seems that the Court will no longer accept any
purpose. The purpose will now be subjected to a true test of reasonableness and the Supreme Court will accept only those that meet its broadened anti-discriminatory standards.
To this legal mire is added Lamb v. Brown," where a statute was challenged as being violative of the equal protection clause for denying juvenile court proceedings to males between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
but granting such proceedings to females in the same age group. The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma upheld the constitutionality of
the statute that the federal court was later to declare unconstitutional. It
reasoned:
[A]s we view the section of the statutes, we do not find it to be so repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States as defendants would attempt to lead the
Court to believe. As we view the situation, the statute exemplifies the legislative
Having found no rational basis for the distinction drawn, it did not have to face
the compelling state interest test to declare the statute unconstitutional.
50. 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
51. 404 U.S. at 76. The statute under review was enacted in 1864 when Idaho
was a territory not yet sufficiently populated to qualify for statehood. It seems
unlikely that the purpose of the statute at the time of enactment was to reduce
the workload of the probate courts. It is more likely that the statute favored men
because women of that era lacked business experience. The purpose reviewed was
the modern purpose of the statute.
52. Id.
53. 456 F.2d 18 (10thCir. 1972).
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judgment of the Oklahoma State Legislature, premised upon the demonstrated
facts of life; and we refuse to interfere with that judgement.54

The purpose of the statute then was "premised on the demonstrated facts
of life."5 If the tenth circuit were to have followed Goesaert strictly, it
would have accepted the reasoning of the Oklahoma court, and held
the purpose to be reasonable, or at least not palpably arbitrary. But the
court of appeals in Lamb followed, without referring to it, Reed v.
Reed,56 refusing to accept the reasoning of Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals. Circuit Judge Barrett, writing for a unanimous court, held:
Lamb v. State .

.

. is not helpful in our search for a rational justification for the

disparity in treatment between 16-18 year old males and 16-18 year old females
under the statute. "Demonstrated facts of life" could mean many things. The
"demonstrated facts" which the Court relied upon are not spelled out. They are

not obvious or apparent. We therefore cannot weigh them to determine if they

"might suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary

and invidious." 5

The court in Lamb demands a specific purpose. It is on new ground, for
the Supreme Court has not expressly required a specific purpose when
applying the equal protection clause to sex discrimination cases. It may
well be that the court's approach is a belief that the purpose will
be obvious to rational judges. Nevertheless, the Court in Reed was
presented with a specific purpose although this was not required by its
prior decisions. In any event, the tenth circuit in Lamb required such
a specific purpose. Even though the reasonable purpose test will be
applied, it is not the traditional one exemplified by Goesaert. The court
in Lamb has adopted an element of the "compelling state interest" test,
i.e., specificity of purpose. Should the purpose fail to be specific as in
Lamb, the court will be unable to apply the reasonable purpose test at all.
The purpose itself, then, will have to be tested to determine if it is
substantial enough to have the reasonableness test applied to it. Although
there are no cases in point, the courts presumably Will first apply tests of
vagueness5" and overbreadth 9 to the purpose to determine if it is sufficiently specific. In Lamb the court is seemingly doing this when writing,
54. Lamb v. State, 475 P.2d 829, 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
55. Benson v. State, 488 P.2d 383 (Okla. Crim.,App. 19.71) and Johnson v.
State, 476 P.2d 397 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) subsequently approved the "demonstrated facts of life" reasoning of Lamb v. State.
56. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
57. 456 F.2d at 20.
58. See,'e.g., Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
59. See,'e.g., Coates'v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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"'[d]emonstrated facts of life' could mean many things." 6 If the purpose
is broad, encompassing too great an area, the purpose will be constitutionally defective. Likewise, if the purpose is general, vague, lacking in
specificity, it too will fail. If the purpose is found wanting on either
ground, the statute will be declared unconstitutional. But, once the purpose survives to this point, the courts will be able to apply the reasonable
purpose test and decide if the purpose is within the equal protection
clause.
Specificity of purpose is not the only new ground upon which Lamb
v. Brown is based, for the court, in going b'eyond Reed, has shifted the
burden of proof. Prior to Lamb the appellant had to show the unreasonableness of the legislative classification. The court said it did not know
what the "demonstrated facts of life" were, and so could not weigh the
reasonableness of such classification. But, under the reasonable purpose
test, that is not its job. The Court previously presumed a statute constitutional, and left the burden upon the appellant to prove either that the
legislature had no power regarding the purpose, 6 or that the classification was not reasonably related to the legislature's purpose. 62 This court
presently implies that even if the appellant did nothing, the statute would
still fall because no grounds existed on which the court could determine
its reasonableness of classification. This is a significant departure from
the reasonable purpose test.
The tenth circuit has blurred the distinctions between the reasonable
purpose test and the "compelling state interest" test, presenting a new
hybrid test to determine if a statute that discriminates on the basis of sex
violates the equal protection clause. Lamb v. Brown may well represent
the manner in which sex discrimination cases are to be decided; however,
until the Supreme Court has had further opportunity to review sex discrimination cases, a trend cannot be posited with any certainty. Yet,
Lamb v. Brown is the product of a new era, where a classification on
account of sex is questioned and subjected to opprobrium, and where
sex discrimination, in whatever form, is denounced by vocal elements in
society. That Lamb v. Brown is a reaction to this new level of consciousness is quite likely. It very well may be a sound reaction, as an attempt
to deal with an old problem in the light of today's world. Federal courts,
having failed to extend the "compelling state interest" test to sex dis60. 456 F.2d at 20.
61. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
62. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 35,8 U.S. 522 (1959); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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crimination cases as Sail'er Inn had done, are perhaps able to handle the
new consciousness of sex discrimination by applying a test that is a cross
between the reasonable purpose test and the "compelling state interest"
test. However, though Lamb v. Brown is the law of the Tenth Circuit, it
cannot be said with certainty that it is the law of the United States.
Supreme Court cases not yet decided will give the answer.

CRIMINAL LAW-Commerce Power Used to Prohibit Intrastate as
well as Interstate Loan Sharking-Title II of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act Declared Constitutional. Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971).
Petitioner loaned a small storekeeper $1,000, which was to be repaid
in fourteen weekly installments of $105. Six or eight weeks later the payments were increased to $130. In two months the storekeeper borrowed
another $2,000, and his payments were increased to $205 per week. In
a few weeks, petitioner insisted that payments of $330 a week be made.
The storekeeper agreed after being told of a man who was hospitalized
after refusing to make such payments. The payments were subsequently
increased to $500, then $1,000 per week. Finally the storekeeper contacted the FBI. Petitioner was arrested and convicted of making an extortionate extension of credit,1 a violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.2 Petitioner claimed that Congress had exceeded its powers
in enacting this statute, since loan sharking was a local activity which
did not fall under the commerce clause of the Constitution.' The Court
1. 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1970) provides in part:
"(6) An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect
to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is
made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result

in the use of violence or other criminal -means to cause harm to the person,
reputation, or property of any person.
(7) An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express
or implicit threat of [sic) use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to
the person, reputation, or property of any person."
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970). The Act is also referred to as the Extortionate

Credit Transactions Act.
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. In addition to the commerce power, Congress relied
on its power under the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution to sustain the Act.
See Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose following 18 U.S.C. § 891
(1970). The Court in Perez did not reach petitioner's claim that the Act was an

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 4 and subsequently the Supreme Court,
affirmed petitioner's conviction, holding that the Act was within the
power of Congress to control activities affecting interstate commerce
under the commerce clause.5
From early in our nation's history to the present, the Supreme Court
has had to decide the scope of the commerce power.' The Court in Perez
stated that the commerce clause reaches three categories of problems:
(1) the use of channels of interstate commerce which Congress deems
are being misused, (2) the protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in commerce, and (3) the activities
affecting commerce.7
The Supreme Court was first called upon to consider congressional
power with regard to regulation of commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden.'
Ogden had an exclusive right under a New York statute to operate steamboats in New York waters. He obtained an injunction to restrict Gibbons
from operating steamboats in New York waters, although Gibbons had
a federal license to operate between New York and New Jersey. The
Court held that Congress had the power to issue the license under the
commerce clause and that New York's attempt to restrict interstate
commerce was invalid.'
Although some subsequent decisions 0 narrowed the broad view of
improper exercise of congressional power under the bankruptcy clause because it
sustained the Act under the commerce power. Several lower courts did sustain the
Act under the bankruptcy clause. See United States v. Fiore, 434 F.2d 966 (1st
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. Calegro De Lutro,
435 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Conn.
1970).
4. United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S. 146
(1971).
5. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). See also U.S.C.A. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (1968), and cases cited
therein.
7. 402 U.S. at 150, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-15 (1970) (shipment of stolen
goods); 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1970) (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970)
(thefts from interstate shipment).
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
9. Id. at 105 (9 Wheat. at 239).
10. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
lton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
Employers' Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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the commerce clause enunciated in Gibbons, the broader view has been
reaffirmed by later cases." In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"2
the company argued that the NLRB's decision that the company was
engaging in unfair labor practices was an attempt to regulate labor
relations between employers and employees and not a regulation of
interstate commerce. The Court, however, ruled that the important factor
was whether the activity affected interstate commerce.' 3 If so, the activity
can be regulated by Congress.' 4
This "affectation theory" was also employed by the Court in United
States v. Darby 5 where the validity of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
193816 was considered. There the Court sustained Congress' power to
exclude from interstate commerce goods which were produced under
conditions violating the minimum wages and maximum hours provisions
of the Act. The Court held that the power of Congress "extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce ....,17
In 1942, the Supreme Court, in Wickard v. Filburn,18 upheld federal
regulation of wheat production, including wheat grown solely for home
consumption. The Court held that even though the activity regulated
was local in nature and appellee's demand for wheat may have been
trivial by itself, the activity could still be reached by Congress if tho
total effect of appellee's activity on interstate commerce, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, was substantial' 9
The "affectation theory" was also employed by the Court in two
companion cases" to sustain the validity of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.21 This Act was a deliberate attempt by Congress to eliminate racial discrimination in certain public accommodations, 22 activities
which were argued to be purely local and thus beyond the reach of
11. See notes 15-34 infra and accompanying text.
12. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 37.
15. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1938,
ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060).
17. 312 U.S. at 118.
18. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
19. Id. at 125, 127-28.
20. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
22. S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
1
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Congress. 21 In Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court "found that a substantial portion of the food served in the restaurant had moved in interstate
commerce." 2a In holding the proper measure to be the effect on commerce
of the class of activities regulated, the McClung Court said that Congress
appropriately considered the "total incidence"2 of discrimination on
commerce.2 0 However, merely finding that the class of activities regulated
by Congress has some substantial effect on commerce is not conclusive
of the Act's constitutionality. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States
the effect on interstate commerce was found to be that the motel was
readily accessible to interstate highways and seventy-five per cent of its
guests were from out of state. 7 The Court, however, enunciated an additional twofold test to determine constitutionality: (1) Congress must
have "a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels
affected commerce .. . ,28 and (2) having established this basis, the
government must then prove that the means selected by Congress to
2
remedy this discrimination were "reasonable and appropriate.
In Maryland v. Wirtz,8" the Court upheld the extension of the Fair
Labor Standards Act"' to employees of enterprises such as hospitals,
nursing homes and schools.3 2 Relying on earlier cases, 3 the Court held
that where the class of activities is rationally defined by Congress, and
that class of activities affects interstate commerce, it is within the reach
of federal power, and the courts have no power "to excise, as trivial,
individual instances" of the class. 4
The Court in Perez relied on the above'cases to justify the loan sharking portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. It should be noted
that the Court in so doing relied most heavily on civil cases. This may
23. 379 U.S. 241, 258; 379 U.S. 294, 298-99.
24. 379 U.S. at 296-97.
25. The phrase "total incidence," as used by the Court, referred to the aggregate impact on commerce of a large number of both small and large restaurants
that discriminate.
26. 379 U.S. 294, 301.
27. 379 U.S. 241, 243.
28. Id. at 258.
29. Id. at 258-59.
30. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
32. Id. § 203(s)(4).
33. 392 U.S. at 193. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
34. 392 U.S. at 193.
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have been for two reasons. In the first place, the Act, while providing
criminal penalties, 5 is ostensibly designed to regulate certain economic
transactions. Secondly, the Act probably could not have-been sustained
solely on the state of the law regarding federal criminal statutes.
In an earlier commerce clause case, involving a criminal statute, 8
the Court allowed federal regulatory power to be invoked to exclude
lottery tickets from interstate shipment, noting that the power was being
exercised to protect the public welfare. In upholding the White-Slave
Traffic Act, 7 the Court allowed Congress to prohibit the transportation
of a woman across state lines for prostitution or other immoral purposes."8 The direct use of channels of interstate commerce was an element necessary for federal jurisdiction in both these cases. This requirement was deemed vital in the case of United States v. Five Gambling
Devices39 wherein the Court refused to allow indictments under a federal
act4" that required sales and deliveries of gambling devices to be reported,
and also required the registration of such devices. The Court found the
important factor to be that the government did not allege that defendant either "bought, sold or moved gambling devices in interstate
commerce ... "41
Two sections of the Anti-Racketeering Act 42 were the forerunners of
the Extortionate Credit Transactions Act. They require a direct link to
interstate commerce in that they prohibit both interference with interstate
commerce by robbery or extortion48 and traveling in interstate commerce
or using interstate facilities to aid in racketeering enterprises.4 4 Both
earlier 45 and more recent federal legislation4 6 also required the same
type of connection with interstate commerce. Such a standard was
missing from the Act challenged in Perez and formed a basis of petitioner's argument in the court of appeals. Appellant argued that the statute
35. See note 77 infra. It was also apparent that the legislative thrust was to
prevent criminal activity. See note 53 infra.
36. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 356-58 (1903).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1970).
38. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
39. 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
40. Act of Jan. 2, 1951, ch. 1194, § 3, 64 Stat. 1135.
41. 346 U.S. at 442.
42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-55 (1970).
43. Id. § 1951.
44. Id. § 1952.
45. Id. § 1201 (originally enacted in 1932).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (prohibiting the crossing of state lines or using facility
of interstate commerce to incite riot) (originally enacted in 1968).
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under which he was convicted was unconstitutional because it allowed a
conviction for a purely intrastate activity and prohibited all extortionate
credit transactions without requiring the government to prove a connection between that activity and interstate commerce. 7 The court rejected
these arguments, 4s and declared that the intrastate activity could be

regulated since Congress had made a rational determination that the
activity had an effect on interstate commerce and that individual proof
4
of effect on commerce is not required in each case. 1
On appeal," ° the Supreme Court decided that petitioner was a member
of the class whose activities are to be regulated, i.e., one who is engaged
in "extortionate credit transactions."'" Once it was determined that petitioner fell within the class, the Court then had to decide whether the
class of activities to be regulated was within the reach of federal power. 2

The Court based its decision largely on evidence presented to Congress.
When Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act, it included strong findings of fact and declarations of purpose which left no
doubt that the Act was designed to combat organized crime's loan sharking activities.53 The evidence upon which Congress had based the Act
was abundant. The amendment which ultimately was to become the "loan
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

426 .F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1078. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Id. at 153.

52. Id. at 152, citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941).
53. Congress made the following "Findings and Declaration of Purpose" in
a note to 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1970):
"(1) Organized crime is interstate and international in character. Its activities involve many billions of dollars each year. It is directly responsible for murders,
willful injuries to person and property, corruption of officials, and terrorization
of countless citizens. A substantial part of the income of organized crime is generated by extortionate credit transactions.
(2) Extortionate credit transactions are characterized by the use, or the express
or implicit threat of the use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm
to person, reputation, or property as a means of enforcing repayment. Among the
factors which have rendered past efforts at prosecution almost wholly ineffective
has been the existence of exclusionary rules of evidence stricter than necessary for
the protection of constitutional rights.
(3) Extortionate credit transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the means and instrumentalities of
such commerce. Even where extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate
in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign commerce."
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shark" portion of the Act grew out of a "profound study of organized
crime" 54 made by twenty-three Congressmen. In addition, two articles
were entered into the Congressional Record, one showing the connection

between loan sharking and organized crime55 and the other containing a
report of New York City law enforcement officials concerned with loan
sharking. 56
With reference to loan sharking as a class of activities affecting interstate commerce, the Court noted the evidence presented to Congress and
found that "[t]he findings by Congress are quite adequate on that
ground,"' T even though the extortionate credit transaction may be purely

intrastate. Apparently the Court took this finding to satisfy not only the
"affectation theory" but also the standards established in Heart of Atlanta
Motel"8 which required a rational basis for the congressional finding.
Although the Court did not specifically apply the standards it had set in
that earlier case, it likewise must have found that the means selected by
Congress to remedy the evil were reasonable and appropriate.5 9
It has been argued that the majority has gone too far in defining the

scope of the commerce power. 60 Circuit Judge Hays in his dissenting
54. 114 Cong. Rec. 14391 (1968) (remarks of Representative McDade).
The study was reported to Congress at 113 Cong. Rec. 24460 (1967).
55. "The loan shark, then, is the indispensable 'money-mover' of the underworld. He takes 'black' money tainted by its derivation from the gambling or
narcotics rackets and turns it 'white' by funneling it into channels of legitimate
trade. In so doing, he exacts usurious interest that doubles the black-white money
in no time; and, by his special decrees, by his imposition of impossible penalties,
he greases the way for the underworld takeover of entire businesses." Cook, If
You Are Willing to Put Up Your Body for Collateral-Just Call "the Doctor"
for a Loan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 19, col. 1 (reproduced
in 114 Cong. Rec. 1429 (1968)).
56. "The problem, the law enforcement experts said, is to collect evidence of
loan-sharking that will stand up in court and win convictions." In addition, "[Iloansharking seldom comes to the attention of the police . . . because loan-sharking
involves a transaction in which two adults . . . participate willingly . . . ." N.Y.

Times, Jan. 29, 1968, at 22, col. 1 (reproduced in 114 Cong. Rec. 1431 (1968)).
The Perez Court recognized that Congress had considered the State of New York
Report, Temporary Commission of Investigation, An Investigation of the Loan
Shark Racket (1965), which showed that loan sharking was controlled by organized criminal syndicates. 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971).
57. 402 U.S. at 155.
58. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
59. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 Va. L. Rev. 717
(1963); 49 Texas L.Rev. 568 (1971).
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opinion in United States v. Perez6 ' wrote that "if extortionate conduct
unrelated to interstate commerce can be made a federal crime, so can
such crimes as robbery, burglary and larceny." 2 Mr. Justice Stewart in
his dissent stressed the fact that under the Act, a defendant could be
"convicted without any proof of interstate movement, of the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his conduct
affected interstate commerce."6 He concluded, therefore, that the Act
was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power in attempting to
regulate a purely local crime. 4 A similar view was also expressed during
the congressional debate over the Act by Representative Eckhardt of
Texas, who argued that loan sharking was a state offense and federal
prosecution of it was a step toward the exercise of a general federal
police power."5
Nevertheless, loan sharking is now within the province of federal laws,
and it is likely to remain there because of its interstate nature66 as viewed
by the Court and Congress, and because of the states' inability to deal
effectively with the problem. The federal government is able to draw
upon many resources not available to local governments, including the
68
FBI and the strike forces.
It was the general lack of adequate state control over loan sharking
that caused Congress to consider the "loan shark" provision of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. With reference to loan sharking, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin stated, "The problem simply cannot be
solved by the states alone. We must bring into play the full resources
of the Federal Government." 6 9
The states have, in fact, faced many formidable problems in controlling
the activities of loan sharks. The lower echelon loan sharks are easily
70
replaced, their loss causing no hardship to the overall operation.
61. 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
62. Id.at 1082.
63. 402 U.S. at 157.
64. Id. at 158 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. 114 Cong. Rec. 1610 (1968) (remarks of Representative Eckhardt).
66. See note 53 supra, for the finding by Congress of which the Supreme
Court in Perez took note.
67. See notes 69-73 infra and accompanying text.
68. "These are units of Federal anticrime operatives that move into cities
that have unusual organized crime problems, in a coordinated effort to convict
racketeers." N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 8.
69. 114 Cong. Rec. 14490 (1968) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
,70. Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System,

53 J. Crim. LC. & P.S. 399, 416 (1962).
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Coupled with this is the difficulty in prosecuting the hierarchy of the
operation, which is partially due to an inability to produce evidence
since potential witnesses are often either "scared," "bought off," or are
ignorant of the identity of those above them in the organization. 71 The
failure of states to control loan sharking is also due to the failure of
the banking and criminal usury laws of the states to deter loan sharking. 2
Further aggravating the problem is the acute fiscal situation facing the
states which causes them to forego the creation of permanent units to
7
combat organized crime. 3
The Act contains many strong measures aimed at organized crime
and is intended to remedy the problems that have plagued state attempts
to prevent loan sharking. 74 It provides that there is prima facie evidence
that the extension of credit is extortionate if all of the following elements
are present:
(1) The debt is unenforceable in a state proceeding.
(2) The annual interest rate exceeds forty-five per cent.
(3) The debtor reasonably believes that the creditor had collected or
attempted to collect extensions of credit by extortionate means
or the creditor had a reputation for the use of such means of
collection.
(4) A total in excess of $100 of credit was outstanding between the
debtor and the creditor when the extension of credit was made. 5
Another section of the Act,7 aimed primarily at upper echelon loan
sharks, prohibits the advancing of money when there are reasonable
grounds to believe that it will be used-directly or indirectly in extortion71. Id. at 417.
72. "Startling as it may seem, the Commission found, and all official witnesses
agreed, that the absence of effective usury laws in this state was a significant factor
in the underworld's move into lqan-sharking." State of New York Report,
Temporary Commission of Investigation, An Investigation of the Loan Shark
Racket 16 (1965).
73. Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Prob. 91, 109 (1969).
74. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b) (1970). In United States v. Calegro De Lutro,
435 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1970), the court went so far as to sustain defendant's
conviction despite the fact that at trial the victim denied that any threats were
made or that he was ever put in fear. The court decided that the testimony of
three FBI agents to the contrary was enough to convict the defendant. This case

seemingly controverts the requirements of § 892(b) (3).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 893 (1970).
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ate credit transactions. Violations of the Act carry a maximum fine of
$10,000 (or, in certain instances, twice the amount loaned) or twenty
77
years in prison, or both.
The Act does, however, have some recognizable limitations and has
not reached the potential that Congress had foreseen. Law enforcement
officials are still plagued by some of the problems which led to the passage of this Act.78 In addition, this Act does not aid in the production
of vital witnesses.79 The repeal of the immunity provision," problems
in witness protection," and the consensual nature of the crime8 2 all
contribute to the reluctance of the witnesses to testify. The Act is insufficient in remedying these problems.
In spite of the Act's shortcomings, however, the sustaining of the Act
by the Supreme Court has ramifications that should be considered. A
purely intrastate activity may now be enough to provide the "federal
jurisdictional peg." This is a departure from traditional federal criminal
statutes which have generally required a jurisdictional nexus such as
transportation in, 8 interference with,8 4 or use or destruction of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 5 In other words, the earlier statutes
protected interests that were federal.
When it passed the Extortionate Credit Transactions Act, Congress
made clear its intent to prohibit all loan sharking, not simply interstate
transactions. 6 The Act is a definite extension of federal criminal juris77.

18 U.S.C. §.§ 892(a), 893 (which permits a fine of twice the amount

loaned), 894(a) (1970).
78. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
79. In a recent loan-sharking trial, the record indicated that seven key
-prosecution witnesses failed to appear to testify against the defendant. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1971, at 57, col. 6.
80. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title II § 223(a), 84 Stat. 929.
81. Lynch & Phillips, Organized Crime-Violence and Corruption, 20 J. Pub.
L. 59, 64-66 (1971).
82. Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Prob. 91, 97 (1969).
83. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970) (obscene matters); 18 U.S.C. §§ 195253 (1970) (anti-racketeering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-15 (1970) (stolen property);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1970) (White-Slave Traffic Act).
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) (interference with commerce by
threats or violence).
85. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1970) (wrecking train or equipment used,
operated or employed in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1970) (mailing
threatening communications). See also notes 36-46 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 53 supra.
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diction to an area previously belonging to the states. Presently, in order
for Congress to regulate in areas of former state control, it is only necessary to do the following: first, provide a rational basis of connection
between the activity in general and interstate commerce, and second,
choose a reasonable means of regulating that activity.8 7
The 1970 Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 88 was a legislative
attempt to control intrastate as well as interstate traffic in illicit drugs.
This Act, like the statute attacked in Perez, does not require a showing
in each case that interstate commerce has been affected. The Act was
also justified by Congressional findings similar to those in Perez.89 Findings resembling those in the 1970 Drug Abuse Act were also made by
Congress in the predecessor statute, the 1965 amendments to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 90 Several circuit courts have sustained
convictions under those 1965 amendments in the face of the same arguments presented in Perez.9 Thus, it is apparent that whenever Congress
decides that a problem is national in scope, cannot be adequately handled
by the states, and constitutes a substantive evil such as drug abuse or
loan sharking, federal regulation is strongly probable. Congress' pragmatic approach to these problems, however, may be slightly less than
consistent with our constitutional framework. This view has already been
expressed in the form of the fear of a national police force established
under the commerce power," and the possibility that such traditionally
local crimes as robbery, burglary, and larceny may be made federal
offenses.9 3
It is clear, however, that the Court has the ability to prevent the. unconstitutional spread of federal power. The Court can strike down further
extensions of federal jurisdiction, make its own determination of whether
or not a particular activity affects interstate commerce; or at the very
least, examine very closely the congressional determinations in this regard. Once it has been determined that the activity affects interstate
87. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
88. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
89. Id. § 801.
90. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 511, as added July 15, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-74, §§ 2-11, 79 Stat. 227 (repealed 1970).
91. United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1004 (1970); United States v. Heiman, 406 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969);
Whalen v. United States, 398 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1968); White v. United States,
395 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968).
92. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
93. 426 F.2d at 1082 (Hays, J., dissenting).
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commerce, it is possible that the Court will invoke a balancing process,
weighing the importance of the problem being regulated with the interests of the states in retaining control in that area. Such balancing was
not expressly done by the Court in Perez, but from its decision, it is
apparent that the need for regulation was found to outweigh other
considerations.
In United States v. Bass, 4 the defendant appealed a conviction for
possession of firearms in violation of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968." 5 The Court required the government to prove that the defendant received, possessed, or transported a
firearm in interstate commerce, stating that simple possession of a firearm
by those prohibited from such possession was insufficient to support a
conviction. Thus, the Court refused to permit an expansion of the federal
police power to criminal activity that did not have a connection with
interstate commerce, even though the criminal activity involved a national problem and a substantive evil. While the Bass decision may
indicate an ability and desire by the Court to prevent the spread of
federal power, it is possible to reconcile the Bass case with Perez because the statute involved in Bass was ambiguous and was not subject
to the clear-cut interpretation found in the Extortionate Credit Transactions Act.
In considering the impact of the Perez decision, it would be folly to
say only that the Court has upheld congressional regulation in an area
formerly preserved for the states. Equally important is the fact that the
door is now open to Congress for further such incursions into areas
heretofore not regulated by the federal government.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Free Press and Fair Trial-Trial Judge
May Not Close Courtroom to Press and Public Without Showing of
Serious and Imminent Threat to the Integrity of the Trial. Oliver v.
Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
During the initial stages of a criminal trial for conspiracy and extortion, several New York newspapers printed articles revealing that the
94.
95.

404 U.S. 336 (1971).
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)

(1970). This section states in part: "Any

person who . . . receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting
commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."
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accused had a previous criminal record and purported underworld connections. The trial judge, respondent-in the instant case, denied a defense

motion for a mistrial after polling the jury and finding that no juror had
seen the articles,' but warned newsmen that they would be held in con-

tempt if they reported "anything other than [what] transpires in this
courtroom."' Subsequently, articles which were critical of respondent's
threats of contempt citations and which referred to the previously published articles concerning the accused appeared in the same and other
newspapers, prompting respondent to close the courtroom to the press

and public. Petitioners, professional journalists, brought this action' for
a judgment to direct respondent to reopen the courtroom, citing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,4 and public trial. 5 The
New York Court of Appeals, realizing that the problem admitted of a
delicate balance between the freedom of the press and the right of an accused to a fair trial, 6 found for petitioners, since there was no showing
that respondent's order barring the public was necessary to meet " 'a seri17
ous and imminent threat' to the administration of justice."
The New York rule on the free press-fair trial dichotomy is difficult to
formulate, since almost all the applicable cases are factually distinguishable. There are a number of approaches which the courts in New York
have formulated in attempting to deal with the dichotomy. One approach
grants to the press the same, but no greater, rights enjoyed by the general
1. Therefore, there was little possibility of that particular set of articles influencing the jury or prejudicing them against the accused; if otherwise, the defense's motion for a mistrial might have been granted. The trial judge is, of course,
interested in eliminating possible sources of reversible error, such as demonstrated
outside influences on the jurors' opinions.
2. 30 N.Y.2d 171, 176-77, 282 N.E.2d 306, 307, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410
(1972).
3. N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 78 (McKinney 1963).
4. U.S. Const. amend. I; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8.
5. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.Y. Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney 1968).
6. 30 N.Y.2d at 182, 282 N.E.2d at 311, 331 N.Y.S. 2d at 414. The court here
takes note of two important Supreme Court decisions which discuss the balancing
interests. See Maryland v Baltimore Radio Show, 321 U.S. 912 (1949) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
7. 30 N.Y.2d at 180, 282 N.E.2d at 310, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 413. By the time of
the court's decision, the accused had been acquitted, thereby rendering petitioner's
action moot; however, the New York court chose to pass on the proceedings anyway, in view of "the sufficient importance and interest" of the questions presented.
For a discussion of standards to determine mootness, see note 39 infra and accompanying text.
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public. In United Press Associations v. Valente,8 relied on by the appellate division in Oliver' to dismiss the newsmen's petition, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the application of the press to restrain a trial
judge from carrying out an exclusion order in a criminal trial was properly denied. First amendment guarantees do not grant the press an)
rights not held by the general public:
[The first amendment has] never been held to confer upon the press a constitutionally protected right of access to sources of information not available to others ...
[Fireedom of the press is in no way abridged by an exclusionary ruling which
denies to the public generally, including newspapermen, the opportunity to "see and
hear what transpired." 10

The court of appeals in Oliver attempted to justify its contrary holding by
distinguishing United Press on several grounds: in United Press, the exclusion order was not specifically aimed at writings in the press, whereas
Judge Postel in Oliver directed his warnings and threats solely to newspapermen; in United Press, a criminal case dealing with compulsory
prostitution, exclusion of the public was made on grounds of public decency, whereas Oliver, which did not deal in any way with a "morals"
charge, had no such rationale for its exclusion order; in United Press, the
court was closed over the accused's objections, whereas in Oliver it was
done upon the accused's application."
A second approach places the issue in a more fundamental perspective. People v. Jelke,12 a companion case to United Press, allowed the accused in that same criminal action to appeal the lack of a public trial,
when the trial judge, over the accused's objections, barred the press and
public in the interest of public decency. 13 The Jelke court held that the
8. 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
9. 37 App. Div. 2d498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (lstDep't 1971).
10. 308 N.Y. at 77, 123 N.E.2d at 778.
11. The Oliver court concludes: "In sharp contrast [to United Press], the record in the present case makes it exceedingly plain that the order closing the
courtroom-made upon the defendant's application-was aimed specifically at the
news media and was intended as a punishment for what the respondent characterized as their 'contumacious conduct' in disregarding his prior admonitions not to
publish 'anything other than [what] transpires in this courtroom.'" 30 N.Y.2d at
179, 282 N.E.2d at 309, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
12. 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
13. "In announcing his ruling [to exclude the press and general public], the
trial judge commented upon 'the obscene and sordid details' which the opening
statements of the district attorney and defense counsel indicated would be adduced, and he observed that 'the sound administration of justice and . . . the interests of good morals' demanded that the curtain be drawn 'on the offensive
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right to a public trial is a fundamental privilege of the defendant in a
criminal prosecution, guaranteed, in New York, by statute.1 4 Therefore,
the exclusionary order was invalid, and the defendant was entitled to a

new trial even without affirmatively showing that he was prejudiced by
the order. But United Press refused to extend that right to professional

newsmen or to the public at large. It was a right which only the criminal
defendant could invoke. Subsequent New York cases confirmed the
United Pressholding that, in New York, the right to a public trial applies

only to the criminally accused, 15 but not to members of the press or
general public. 6
A third approach to the problem examines whether there is or should

be any clear public policy for or against court restrictions on press coverage of trials. A New York case, cited by petitioners as implying "a strong
public policy against compulsory court-imposed restraints on the press,"' 7
is New York Post v. Leibowitz. 8 There the issue concerned a trial judge's
refusal to allow a newspaper to obtain a transcript of the judge's charge

to the jury in a criminal case, after the defendant had been acquitted.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial judge exceeded his

power in directing the court stenographer not to furnish the transcript.
The court declared that public policy considerations dictated the fullest

possible public scrutiny of judicial proceedings. 19 However, the facts
can be distinguished from Oliver in that the trial itself was open to the
obscentiy of this already over-publicized trial.' " 308 N.Y. at 60-61, 23 N.E.2d at
770.
14. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney 1968). In addition, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), later made the sixth amendment provisions regarding
public trial applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947) (right to a public
trial).
15. In a civil case either party may raise his right to a public trial.
16. See, e.g., James v. Powell, 51 Misc. 2d 705, 273 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
17. Point of counsel, 30 N.Y.2d at 172.
18. 2 N.Y.2d 677, 143 N.E.2d 256, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957). "We are all
agreed that fundamental considerations of public policy demand that court
proceedings in a publicly held trial be open to the fullest public scrutiny, so long
as the case is not one in which preservation of secrecy in respect of the court
records has been recognized by law." Id. at 682, 143 N.E.2d 258, 163 N.Y.S.
412.
19. Compare the instant case, where the press and public were barred from the
trial itself while it was in progress, where articles involving the accused in underworld activities were published before the accused's acquittal, and where the issue
involved the press's right to attend public trials, and not merely the public's right to
obtain certain court transcripts.
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public, the accused had already been acquitted, and the issue merely concerned the delivery of a court manuscript to one legally entitled to have
0
it.2
Wiggins v. Ithaca JournalNews, Inc.,21 anticipated Oliver's call for a
balance between freedom of the press and the right of an accused to a
fair trial, free from prejudicial press coverage; however, in contrast to
Oliver, Wiggins upheld the trial court's order to the press not to reveal
certain information. 2 However, Wiggins, like United Press, is distinguishable from Oliver, in that Wiggins concerns a New York youthful offender statute23 which allows greater privacy in deference to the accused's
age. Therefore, the exclusionary order in Wiggins does not necessarily
justify exclusionary orders in cases dealing with adult offenders, despite
the breadth of the court's language concerning the limitations on freedom of the press.
Thus a review of New York precedents discloses no predictable pattern. While United Press and Wiggins clearly reflect a policy of press exclusion, they are factually distinguishable from Oliver for the reasons
cited above. New York Post, like Oliver, points to judicial recognition of
the right of the press to cover judicial proceedings and express opinions
20. Most of the cases about to be discussed deal with the judicial common
law contempt power and its utilization to punish harmful or offensive extra-record
utterances, e.g., newspaper editorials critical of a trial in progress. Although Oliver
dealt with an exclusionary order, preceded by threats of contempt, it is still germane to examine proposals regarding the contempt power, since the Oliver court
itself would apply the standards for contempt to exclusionary orders. 30 N.Y.2d at
180-81, 282 N.E.2d at 310, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
21. 57 Misc. 2d 356, 292 N.Y.S.2d 920 (City Ct. of Ithaca 1968).
22. Wiggins concerned two youths charged with petit larceny for stealing gasoline cans. The presiding judge directed that respondents-a reporter and a newspaper-not reveal the identity of the youths or the charge, since the accused were
to receive youthful offender treatment under N.Y. Code Crim. Pro. § 913-f (now
N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 720.15 (McKinney 1971)), which provided that "[t]he
court ... may, but only as to the public, order the indictment or information sealed
in the case of a youth charged with crime." Nonetheless, respondents did publish
the information, and were duly charged with contempt. The court noted that
"[fireedom of the press is not an unbridled right to publish any and all news regardless of its source or its effects. . . . [f]reedom of the press must be balanced
against other rights such as the right of an accused to a fair trial free from unwarranted press coverage or, as here, the right for an infant to be spared from the
life-long devastating effects of publicity for what might have been one irresponsible
act caused solely by immaturity based on age alone." 57 Misc. 2d at 361, 292
N.Y.S.2d at 925.
23. See note 22 supra.
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thereon; however, the case is likewise distinguishable from Oliver in that
it deals only with delivery of a court transcript after the trial was over.

Oliver is significant as the first New York case which holds that in the
criminal trial process, the press or general public may not be excluded
from the courtroom without a showing that it is necessary to meet serious

and imminent threats to the integrity of the trial.
In so deciding, Oliver relies on United States Supreme Court eases
dealing with freedom of the press and the right of the accused to a trial

by an impartial jury free from the outside influences of prejudicial publicity. The most important of these is Bridges v. California,24 the first
decision to apply to contempt cases the "clear and present danger" 25 test
eventually used by the New York court in Oliver. Specifically, the Bridges
Court formulated " a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished.""6 The Court emphasized the importance
and predominance of free expression:
[T]he First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society,
27
will allow.

Bridges was upheld and extended in a host of later cases, the most im29
2
portant being Pennekamp v. Florida" and Craig v. Harney.
24. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The case concerned a telegram and newspaper editorials, written by the respective petitioners, which were extremely critical of
various judicial proceedings involving labor matters. The Supreme Court reversed
petitioners' contempt convictions, since their writings did not present a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of justice.
25. The test itself derived from certain other freedom of speech cases, notably
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Schaefer v. United Stat~s, 251 U.S.
466 (1920); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26. 314 U.S. at 263.
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). In Pennekamp, petitioners were newspapermen who
published editorials and a cartoon criticizing court proceedings, one of which was
pending trial. The Supreme Court overturned their contempt convictions, since the
danger to fair judicial administration was not clear and immediate, unde'r the
Bridges test. Id. at 334, 346-50. Also, the Court repeated the Bridges dictum that
freedom of discussion should be given the widest possible latitude compatible with
the requirement of the fair administration of justice. Id. at 347.
29. 331 U.S. 367 (1947). The case concerned news articles which unfairly
reported a pending case, and an editorial which severely criticized the trial judge
(an elected layman). Although a motion for a new trial was pending, the Supreme
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In dealing with the dichotomy between free press and fair trial, the
Oliver court applied the Bridges "clear and present danger" test, but may
have disregarded an important distinction in so doing: Bridges and its
progeny dealt with judge-directed utterances, i.e., media statements
critical of the presiding judge in a given case; whereas Oliver also dealt
with potential extra-record influences on the jury in a criminal trial."0
Insofar as Judge Postel's exclusion order was directed at those newspapermen who publicly criticized the judge's threats of contempt, the Bridges
line of cases has some applicability; but insofar as the exclusion order was
aimed at protection of the accused in the eyes of the jury, the Bridges
cases are distinguishable. As one reviewer has noted:
The contempt cases [Bridges, et al.] enunciated a constitutional standard which has
established virtually absolute protection for judge directed publications. Although these decisions do not deal with the problems of publications influencing
a jury in a criminal trial, they have been read by the courts as holding that publications in this context are similarly protected. . . .It is suggested that the first
meaningful step in analyzing the problem of controlling extra record influence
upon a jury is understanding that the problem is not resolved by application of
the Bridges doctrine. 81
Court still did not find the clear and present danger to the administration of justice
that would have been necessary to sustain the contempt convictions; the Court
explicitly followed Bridges and Pennekamp. Id. at 368-70, 375-78. Further, the
Court declared that the judicial contempt power is not designed to protect sensitive
judges from the vagaries of public opinion. Id. at 376.
30. Recall that Judge Postel polled the jurors to see if any of them had seen
the first set of articles which discussed the accused's past criminal record and
underworld connections; see note 1 supra and accompanying text. Thus, in part,
Judge Postel was apparently trying to prevent extra-record influences on the jury.
But, in addition, the judge himself seems to have been offended personally by the
second set of articles, which were critical of his threats of contempt; the court of
appeals states: "He [Judge Postel] expressed displeasure with the articles and, at
one point, took issue with the manner in which they portrayed him." 30 N.Y.2d
at 177, 282 N.E.2d at 308, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 410. Immediately thereafter the judge
granted the accused's request for exclusion of the public and press, without again
polling the jurors and without any indication that the jurors had seen any of the
second set of articles. This would indicate that the judge may in part have acted
to exclude the press because of the press's personal criticism of him.
31. Barist, The First Amendment and Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity-An
Analysis, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 425, 431, 433 (1968). Barist goes on to discuss
various reasons for the inapplicability of Bridges to cases like Oliver, where outside
influence may affect the jury. For example, even the Supreme Court, in Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), drew a distinction between judge-directed and jurydirected publications. The Court noted, "Neither Bridges, Pennekamp, nor Harney
involved a trial by jury. In Bridges it was noted that 'trials are not like elections,
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The Supreme Court has at times emphasized strongly the need for a
trial court to protect a criminal defendant from potentially damaging
publicity, such as may have been present in Oliver. For example, in
Sheppard v. Maxwell,3 2 the Court reversed a conviction, largely because

of "saturating" prejudicial publicity." The Court qualified the well known
to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper', and
of course, the limitations on free speech assume a different proportion when expression is directed toward a trial as compared to a grand jury investigation." Id.
at 389-90 (citation omitted). Likewise, an examination of the historical reasons
for the Bridges line of decisions indicates its inapplicability to jury-directed publications. Barist, 36 Fordham L. Rev. at 435-38 (1968).
32. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). This was the well-publicized murder case in which
Dr. Samuel Sheppard was brought to trial for the alleged slaying of his wife. The
case reached the Supreme Court on a petition for habeas corpus, petitioner contending that he did not receive a fair trial because of the massive publicity accompanying the investigation and trial.
33.
In discussing the prejudicial publicity, the Supreme Court said: "There
can be no question about the nature of the publicity which surrounded Sheppard's
trial. We agree, as did the Court of Appeals, with the findings in Judge Bell's
opinion for the Ohio Supreme Court: 'Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate
the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparallelled in recent annals. Throughout
the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week
trial, circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the American public in the bizarre. .

.

. In this atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for the

news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.' Indeed, every court that has
considered this case, save the court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which
the news media inflamed and prejudiced the public.
"Much of the material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard from
the witness stand, such as the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the
murder investigtion and must be guilty since he had hired a prominent criminal
lawyer; that Sheppard was a perjurer; that he had sexual relations with numerous
women; that his slain wife had characterized him as a 'Jekyll-Hyde'; that he was
'a bare-faced liar' because of his testmony as to police treatment; and, finally, that
a woman convict claimed Sheppard to be the father of her illegitimate child. As
the trial progressed, the newspapers summarized and interpreted the evidence, devoting particular attention to the material that incriminated Sheppard, and often
drew unwarranted inferences from inestimoft) ..
"Nor is there doubt that this deluge of publicity reached at least some of the
jury. On the only occasion that the jury was queried, two jurors admitted in open
court to hearing the highly inflammatory charge that a prison inmate claimed
Sheppard as the father of her illegitimate child. Despite the extent and nature of
the publicity to which the jury was exposed during trial, the judge refused defense
counsel's other requests that the jurors be asked whether they had read or heard
specific prejudicial comments about the case ....
In these circumstances, we can
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Bridges language: although freedom of discussion should be given the

widest scope compatible with the fair administration of justice, it must
not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose of deciding controversies
according to legal procedures based only on evidence received in open

court.84 Furthermore, to prevent prejudice, the Court determined that a
trial court is specifically authorized to do what is necessary to protect the
defendant:
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused ....

Of

course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until
the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity.
...If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new
trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives;
the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. 85

Similarly, in Estes v. Texas, 36 the Supreme Court held that the defendant had been deprived of his fourteenth amendment right to due process
by the televising of his highly publicized trial. The case is distinguishable
from Oliver in that Estes dealt with television coverage of the trial and
because several Estes jurors admitted having seen pre-trial broadcasts. 7
assume that some of this material reached members of the jury." 384 U.S. at 35657 (footnotes and citations omitted).

34. Id. at 350-51.
35. Id. at 362-63.
36. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
37. Id. More fully, the Court discussed the damaging publicity that dominated
the pretrial period: "The [pretrial] hearing was televised live and repeated on tape
in the same evening, reaching approximately 100,000 viewers. In addition, the
courtroom was a mass of wires, television cameras, microphones and photographers. The petitioner, the panel of prospective jurors, who were sworn the second
day, the witnesses and the lawyers were all exposed to this untoward situation. The
judge decided that the trial proceedings would be telecast. He announced no restrictions at the time. This emphasized the notorious nature of the coming trial,
increased the intensity of the publicity on the petitioner and together with the
subsequent televising of the trial beginning thirty days later inherently prevented a
sober search for the truth. This is underscored by the fact that the selection of
the jury took an entire week. As might be expected, a substantial amount of that
time was devoted to ascertaining the impact of the pretrial televising on the prospective jurors. As we have noted, four of the jurors selected had seen all or part
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The Estes Court, however, spoke more broadly than the facts before it
when it declared that the freedom of the press must not be allowed to get
in the way of a fair trial:
The purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused
would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned....
The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs .

.

. and generally informing the citizenry of public events and

occurences, including court proceedings. While maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this important function in a democratic society its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
judicial process. . . . "[TIhe life or liberty of any individual in this land should
not be put in jeopardy because of actions of any news media. '38

The approach of the Oliver court to the question of outside media
publicity and criminal trials seems, at once, to balance freedom of the
press with the right of a defendant to a trial free from prejudicial

publicity, and to clarify the public interest which underlies this freedom
of information.3" Having distinguished United Press°40 the Oliver court
of those broadcasts." Id. at 550-51. Recall in Oliver there was no showing that
any of the jurors saw any of the prejudicial articles; see note 30 supra.
38. 381 U.S. at 538-40 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Bell, 464
F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court held that the press and public may be
temporarily excluded from a hearing concerning an airplane hijacker to prevent
public revelation of the secret "profile" used by airline personnel to identify potential hijackers. The court summed up those cases where public exclusion has been
allowed: "Barring the public including the press from the suppression hearing in
this case presents no great constitutional difficulty. While secret proceedings are
of course odious and smack of ideologies as repugnant to the Founders as they
are today, there is precedent for the proposition that limited exceptions are consitutionally permissible. Thus the exclusion of the public in whole or in part has
been found constitutionally acceptable where it was deemed necessary to protect
the defendant, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Tex-as, 381
U.S. 532 (1965); where there has been harassment of witnesses, United States
ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957
(1970); or to preserve order, United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966)." [citations omitted] Id. at 670.
39. 30 N.Y.2d at 176, 282 N.E.2d at 307, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 409. The court
initially determined justiciability with respect to both mootness and standing questions: first, although the accused's acquittal rendered the'appeal for the reopening
of the courtroom moot, the court found the questions capable of repetition and of
sufficient importance to justify a decision. Id. at 177, 282 N.E.2d at 308, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 411. Regarding the question of mootness, the court relied on United
Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. at.76, 123 N.E.2d at 778; East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 135, 219 N.E.2d 172,
175-76, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346 (1966); and Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein, 300 N.Y.
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decides the issue using the Bridges "clear and present danger" test, the
applicability of which is discussed above. 41 In applying this test the court
reveals its reasoning:
[E]ven if we were to assume that such an [exclusionary] order could ever be justified, and we do not here reach or consider that question, it could stand only upon
a clear showing-similar to that required to sustain a contempt order-that it was
necessary to meet "a serious and imminent threat" to "the integrity of the trial."
We find no such showing in the record before us. 42

The court justifies its decision by noting that there was no evidence that
the jurors had seen any of the articles, and, since the articles did not deal
with courtroom occurrences, closing the trial could not logically prevent
them.43
It is interesting to note that the court, mindful of the balancing interests of free press and fair trial, would leave it up to the press to censor
itself. In so doing, the court refers to similar dictum in the Sheppard
case:
Because of the vital function served by the news media in guarding "against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
402, 404, 91 N.E.2d 581 (1950). See also H. Cohen & A. Karger, Powers of the
New York Court of Appeals 420-21 (rev. ed. 1952). Cf. SEC v. Medical Comm.
for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); 30 N.Y.2d at 179, 282 N:E.2d at 309,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 412. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Regarding the question of standing, the
court determined that petitioners had standing to attack the exclusion order since
"[they] were the direct targets of the court's order, and their ability to comment
upon the trial as professional journalists [was] thereby impaired ... 30 N.Y.2d
at 179, 282 N.E.2d at 309, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
40.' See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
41. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
42. 30 N.Y.2d at 180-81, 282 N.E.2d at 310, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (citation
omitted).
43. "The significant fact, however, is that the respondent had determined, by
questioning the jurors, that no one of them had read the articles, and there is
likewise not the slightest showing or indication that any of them had seen the
second series of news items which preceded the order closing the trial.
Moreover, since the articles complained of dealt with Persico's [the accused's]
alleged criminal record and underworld connections, and in no way related to any
events which had transpired in the courtroom, their publication obviously would
not, indeed could not, have been prevented by refusing to allow the press to attend
the trial. In other words, even if the reporting in this case was improper and
tended to prejudice the defendant, it is manifest that closing the trial was not the
means to be employed to cure the prejudice or prevent a continuation of the
impropriety." Id. at 181, 282 N.E.2d at 310-11, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
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to extensive public scrutiny and criticism", the Supreme Court has emphasized
that it has been "unwilling to place any direct limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for '[w]hat transpires in the court room is

public property.'

44

The Oliver court, however, admits that on occasion positive action
must be taken by trial courts to protect against prejudicial outside influence, and it delineates the actions that may be required. However,
the court specifically refuses to pass on the question of whether a trial
judge ever has -the power to exclude the press and public in order to
protect a criminal defendant.45
Resolution of the problem of prejudicial publicity presents a fundamental question for which existing solutions may seem inadequate or
insufficient, and for which there has been no dearth of other proposals.
For.example, the American Bar Association has adopted the "Reardon
Report," a study of an advisory committee 41 which advocates only
limited use-of the contempt power, although recognizing that such use
may be necessary in at least some instances.4" Thus, applying the recom44. Id. at 182, 282 N.E.2d at 311, 331 N.Y:S.2d at 414. Similarly, in the
"Pentagon Papers" case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), the majority expressed its reluctance to censor other types of media
stories. Id. at.714.
45. "Of course, as the Supreme Court observed in Sheppard, the problem of
prejudicial publicity is one which the courts must meet not by the mere 'palliative'
of declaring mistrial or reversing a conviction but, rather, by taking appropriate
remedial steps 'by rule and regulation' to 'protect their processes from prejudicial
outside interference.' In most instances, the trial judge will be.able to deal effectively with potential prejudice stemming from adverse press publicity by cautioning
the jurors to avoid exposure to such publicity. and by carefully instructing them to
disregard any prejudicial material, which might come to their attention, that was
not presented to them in court. However, there may well be extreme situationsin no way comparable to the present case-in which such procedures may be inadequate aid ineffectual to assure a fair trial. The court may then find itnecessary
to sequesterthe jury . . . . But-whether the judge has the power in any case to
close the courtroom to the public and the press in order to.protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial is, as already indicated, a question we need not here pass upon."
30 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 282 N.E.2d at 311, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 415. (footnotes and
citations omitted).
46. P. Reardon,'Standards Relating to Fair Trial and FreePress, ABA Project
on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice (1966) [hereinafter cited as Reardon
Report].
47. The appropriate parts of the committee's recommendation are as follows:
"The use of the contempt power against persons who disseminate information by
means of public communication, or who make statements for -dissemination, can
in certain circumstances raise grave constitutional questions. Apart from these
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mendations of this study, no contempt order or threat would have been
valid under the facts of Oliver, since it is either doubtful or at least

difficult to prove whether the newsmen's articles were "reasonably
calculated to affect the outcome of the trial."48 However, the Reardon
Report remains only a proposal.
Similarly, there are those who would favor a tougher, statutory solution to avoid any problems posed by the questionable constitutionality
of the common law contempt power, particularly in view of decisions4"
that curtail that power.50 By contrast, the Reardon Report does not
recommend the enactment of any statutory restrictions on the press, "in
the absence of the clearest showing that less drastic measures will not
achieve the objective," 51 and cites five reasons for its position.52
questions, indiscriminate use of that power can cause unnecessary friction and stifle
desirable discussion. On the other hand, it is essential that deliberate action constituting a serious threat to a fair trial not go unpunished and that valid court
orders be obeyed. It is therefore recommended that the contempt power should be
used only with considerable caution but should be exercised in at least the following instances ....
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in progress

or that a jury is being selected for such trial:
(i) disseminates by any means of public communication an extrajudicial
statement relating to the defendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond
the public record of the court in the case, if the statement is reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the trial and seriously threatens to have such
an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement with the expectation that it will be so disseminated.
(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid judicial order not to disseminate until completion of the trial or disposition without trial, specified information referred to in the course of a judicial hearing from which the public is excluded under sections 3.1 or 3.5(d) of these recommendations." Id. at 14-15.
48. Id. at 14.
49. E.g., Bridges v. California, supra note 24-27 and accompanying text.
50. Barist, supra note 32, at 451. To quote from Barist: "Any program instituting direct control over mass media reporting of criminal cases should receive its
authorization from legislative enactment, rather than drawing upon any inherent
power of a court. It would seem particularly unwise for control to be exercised by
means of a common law contempt power. The rather shabby history of contempt
by publication and the open hostility evidenced to its expansion by the Supreme
Court indicates that while its continued use may pose an interesting theoretical
question, it would adversely affect the constitutionality of any attempt to prohibit
extra-record influence." Id.
51. Reardon Report at 69-70.
52. id. at 70-73 mentions five possible difficulties with statutory restrictions:
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Finally, in discussing alternative solutions it might be interesting to
note Great Britain's approach to the issue. If the United States places great
emphasis on its cherished first amendment guarantee of free press,5"
England must be said to take the opposite position by adjudging
virtually any publication made after arrest as grounds for contempt.

While the press may report, a fortiori, the facts of a trial and its attendant circumstances, definite limits are placed on the reporting of other
information.
[The English] system permits the news media to report the commission of crimes
and the fact of arrest, to report judicial proceedings in full, and, within limits, to
criticize the outcome after judgment. But beyond this, the media act at their peril.
Perhaps prior to arrest, and clearly after arrest, the media may not, for example,
publish any statements about the character of the defendant or his prior record,
any opinions as'to his guilt or innocence, any evidence not introduced-whether
or not acquired by independent investigation--or a photograph of the accused
54
when it is reasonably clear that identity is in dispute.

The Reardon Report is critical of the possibility of increased use of
the contempt power against the media, as is done in Britian, for certain
specified reasons. 5
1) Problems of draftsmanship: "The draftsman must steer between the Scylla of
excessive specificity, which may be taken as implied approval of everything not
prohibited, no matter how inflammatory or prejudicial, and the Charybdis of
excessive generality, which is sure to lead to uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack
of effective enforcement." Id. at 70. 2) Direct statutory restraints on the news
media may be unconstitutional. 3) "[P]articular care must be taken not to adopt
measures which may impair the benefits derived from informing the public and
from a full discussion of issues of public importance." Id. at 71 (footnote omitted).
4) Increase in media self-restraint. Id. at 71-72 nn.201-06. Reticence to interfere
with private decision-making. Id. at 72.
53. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), wherein the Supreme
Court held that the first amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the
average citizen's obligation to appear before a grand jury and answer questions pertaining to a criminal investigation. The case is referred to as the "Caldwell case"
because of the fact that the reporter in question was Earl Caldwell of the New
York Times.
54. Reardon Report at 68-69 (footnote omitted). But see Jaffe, Trial
by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 504, 505-13 (1965) for reasons why the United States has taken a contrary view.
55. Reardon Report at 70. The reasons: 1) "the British experience suggests
that the exercise of such power by judges may serve to stifle desirable public discussion of issues and to diminish the crusading zeal of the press"; 2) "any significant
expansion of the use of the contempt power against the news media would pose
constitutional questions that have yet to be resolved." Reardon Report at 70.
Bridges, Oliver, et al. would point to the need at least to demonstrate a "clear and
present danger."
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The solution in Oliver may seem to some critics of the press to be no
solution at all, since it allows the press great leeway and formulates no
stricter standard of behavior than the "clear and present danger" test. "
Actually, the decision embodies fundamental principles of American law.
Freedom of the press and fair trial, both of which are constitutional
guarantees, are to be balanced, and publication permitted so long as
there is no demonstrable deleterious effect on the accused. The Supreme
Court has given trial judges the power"7 to keep prejudicial information
from jurors, 8 and this power wisely used can do much to nullify the
effects of such publicity. Finally, Oliver calls on the press to police itself,
which is a more desirable alternative than to permit some external body
to decide what may or may not be publicized.
New York City, along with other American urban areas, has seen the
recent proliferation of sensational and widely publicized trials, in which
potential outside influence resulting from widespread media coverage
is a distinct possibility, especially in trials which involve key social undercurrents, e.g., the trials of "political prisoners" and Black Panthers, and
the trials of those who have allegedly leaked classified information to
the press. This type of trial will almost certainly continue. In this arena
of controversy, Oliver plays an important role in setting out the rules
pursuant to which newsmen may keep the public informed.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-Section 402(a)(23)--Percentage Reduction
Factor Applied to Aid to Families with Dependent Children Payments
Held Not Violative of Statutory or Constitutional Requirements. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
Appellants, including black and Mexican-American recipients of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in Texas, brought a class
action to challenge the state's method of computing aid funds as violative
of Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act.' AFDC is one of four
major categorical assistance programs established by the Social Security
56.

For one comment chastising the press for its "characteristic myopia" about

the problem of media interference with fair trials, see Comment, The Press in a
Black Robe, 45 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 170, 171 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
58. E.g., by means of sequestration. See note 45 supra.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)
Security Act of 1935.

(1970), amending § 402(a)(23) of the Social
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Act of 1935.2 Under the program, the federal government provides a
proportional share of all assistance given to persons who are within any
of the categories, with participating state and local governments paying
the remainder.' In order to participate, states are required to submit an
AFDC plan for approval by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and the state plan must conform to the requirements of
4
the Social Security Act and applicable HEW regulations.
While the states are accorded significant discretion in their individual
programs," there are two factors which must enter into the determination
of benefits to be paid. First, the state must establish a "standard of need,"
a minimum subsistence level for determining who is eligible for assistance." Second, a state must then decide the "level of benefits" or amount
of assistance that will be paid.' Some states purport to pay 100 per cent
of the amount required to give a family the minimum subsistence income; other states grant a percentage of the standard of need; others impose a maximum on the amount that can be given to any family or
individual." Texas, to comply with the amendments to the Social Security
Act 9 increased the standard of need for aid recipients by .11 per cent
but had changed from a maximum-grant system to a percentage reduction system in which only 75 per cent of the standard of need was paid
to AFDC recipients. Additionally, Texas chose to deduct outside income
earned by recipients after applying the percentage reduction to the
standard of need rather than before, resulting in lower payments or
disqualification of some recipients with outside income.10
In addition to their statutory claim, appellants made an equal protection argument, contending -that the Texas system was not rationally
based and discriminated against the proportionately larger number of
2. Old Age Survivors and Disability Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3011-429 (1970);
Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970); Aid to
the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06,(1970), and Aid for.the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1970).
3. 42 U:S.C. §.603 (1970). See,.e.g., King v.'Smith, 392. U.S. 309, 316-17

(1968).
4. 42 U.S.C. H8 601-04 (1970).
5. Rosado v. Wyman, 397'U'.S. 397, 408 (1970).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F. Supp. 336, 349 (E.D. La. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
9. See notes 11-12 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 51 infra.
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blacks and Mexican-Americans in the AFDC program by providing
for a lesser percentage of aid than in other social welfare programs. The
action was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. A three-judge court rejected the constitutional argument but upheld appellants' claim that the percentage reduction system
violated the congressional command of Section 402(a) (23). u The
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment in
light of Rosado v. Wyman, 12 and the three-judge court entered a new
judgment denying all relief and rejecting appellants' new statutory
argument that the state's method of deducting outside income after
applying a percentage reduction factor to the standard of need violated
the congressional enactment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
Section 402(a) (23) does not require a computation procedure that
maximizes individual eligibility for subsidiary benefits and that appellants
had failed to show the Texas system was racially discriminatory or unconstitutionally arbitrary."3
In 1967, the Administration introduced legislation to amend the social
security laws. The proposals related to the AFDC program looked to
more adequate assistance for welfare recipients and set up several training programs along with child care programs designed to permit AFDC
parents to take advantage of the training. 4 One of the proposals emerged
as Section 402(a) (23), which provides that:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must . . . (23)
provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs
of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since
such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted. 15

The proper meaning of this provision-whether it required an actual
dollar increase in AFDC payments or simply the application of a cost-ofliving factor to the standard of need set by the states'--was considered
11.
12.
13.
14.

Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 409 (1970).

15.

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970), amending § 402(a)(23) of the Social

Security Act of 1935.
16. The "standard of need" is the amount each state defines as necessary for
subsistence of an individual in that state. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-03 (1970).
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by the federal courts in at least three districts" before a definitive examination of the issue was made by the Supreme Court.
In Lampton v. Bonin, 8 plaintiffs brought a class action for declaratory relief to prevent the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare from
making a 10 per cent reduction in aid to families with dependent children. The department, in accordance with Section 402(a) (23), had
raised its standard of need to reflect a 20 per cent rise in living costs, but
-it reduced its actual AFDC payments by abolishing its system of dollar
maximums and adopting a ratable reduction of 42.13 per cent against
each recipient family's recognized need. At issue was whether the state
could, without violating the federal statute, supply only about half of the
amount it had determined was required for bare subsistence. Over a
strong dissent, the court construed Section 402(a) (23) narrowly, and
reluctantly concluded that Louisiana had complied fully with its mandate. 19
The Lampton decision was handed down on July 16, 1969. Fifteen
*days later, the three-judge district court in Jeflerson v. Hackney0 came
to an opposite conclusion. Like Louisiana, the State of Texas had increased its standard of need for AFDC recipients by 11 per cent, removed its maximums on AFDC payments and then through a percentage
reduction factor granted only 50 per cent (later raised to 75 per cent) of
the calculated need of each AFDC family. Because this system had the
result of reducing benefits for the majority of AFDC recipients, 21 the
court held that it was violative of Section 402(a) (23), which "in terms
of its language, purpose, and legislative history ...requires that Texas
...must adjust upwards its AFDC payments to fully reflect the 11%
rise in the cost of living." 2 Because of this, the court enjoined the Texas
2
Department of Public Welfare from implementing its plan. 1
New York's response to the 1967 amendment was challenged in Ro17. For a comprehensive analysis of § 402(a).(23) prior to the Supreme
Court's holding in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), see Comment, Section
402(a)(23) of the 1967 Social Security Act Amendments: A False Hope? 58
Geo. L.J. 591 (1970) [hereinafter cited as A False Hope?].
18. 304 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1969).

19.
20.
.21.
22.
23.

Id.
304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346.
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sado v. Wyman." New York had changed its system of calculating an
AFDC family's standard of need from an examination of each family's
individual needs to a computation based simply on the size of the family." New York continued to pay 100 per cent of standard of need, but
the effect of its action was to lower the standard of need for some families. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said this was not violative of Section 402(a)(23).16 Interpreting the statute strictly, as in
Lampton,27 the court concluded that the only requirement imposed by
the federal statute was an adjustment by the state of its standard of need
to reflect increases in living costs. Provided it complied with this requirement, the court said that a state was free to lower its level of AFDC payments by changing its system of calculating the standard of need.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded in Rosado 8
holding that New York's action had significantly reduced the content of
its standard of need in violation of Section 402(a) (23). Mr. Justice
Harlan agreed with the lower courts that the legislative history of the Act
"reveals little except that we have before us a child born of the silent
union of legislative compromise." 9 Nevertheless, he added, the express
words of the statute clearly mandate that states must (1) re-evaluate
their standard of need, and (2) adjust any maximums that are part of
their AFDC programs.30 From this and common-sense assumptions, he
concluded that the Act had two broad purposes:
First, to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public
assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short
of fulfilling actual need; second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on
a more equitable basis. Consistent with this interpretation of § 402(a) (23), a

State may, after recomputing its standard of need, pare down payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching
to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the actual standard of
need.3 '

The Court went on to say that the federal statute "invalidates any
state program that substantially alters the content of the standard of need
24. 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
25. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 131a (McKinney Supp. 1972) (formerly Soc.
Welfare Law).
26. 414 F.2d at 180.
27. 304 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
28. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
29. Id. at 412.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 412-13.
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in such a way that it is less than it was prior to the enactment of § 402(a)
(23),"32 barring legitimate justification. But under the statute a state
may "redefine its method for determining need," and may "accommodate
any increases in its standard [of need] by reason of 'cost-of-living' factors
to its budget by reducing its level of benefits."3
The Court's interpretation appeared to support the actions of states
like Louisiana and Texas which first increased the standard of need that
would provide subsistence for an AFDC family but then, in order to stay
within the state's welfare budget, decreased the amount of that standard
that the state would pay. 4 The results of the Louisiana, Texas and New
York plans were similar, but New York-while paying 100 per cent of
standard of need-had in the Court's opinion impermissibly lowered the
standard in violation of the congressional mandate.
Apparently recognizing that this interpretation could indeed make Section 402 (a) (23) appear to be mere "legislative window dressing,"85 the
Rosado Court was careful to add that this did not render the statute
meaningless. The Court said that the statute served as a "nudge" to the
states toward at least three practical and political goals.8 6 First, by requiring an increase in the standard of need, more families with incomes
below the new standard would qualify for AFDC aid. The states must
then accept responsibility for these additional individuals and "place
them among those eligible for the care and training provisions ' 37 of the
1967 amendments, including such programs as work incentive and medical aid. Eligibility for these noncash benefits is keyed to receipt of AFDC
payments.3 s Second, while states are free to reduce AFDC payments by
paying a lower percentage of the standard of need, the state must at least
"accept the political consequence of such a cutback ...bringing to light
the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum ac32.
33.

Id. at 419.
Id.

34. Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1969); Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
35. A False Hope?, supra note 17, at 596.
36. 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1070).
37. Id.
38. Receipt of AFDC aid is a prerequisite for a family to receive family development services, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(14) (1970); employment assistance, id.
§ 602(a) (15) (A); protection against child's neglect or abuse, id. § 602(a)(16);

plans to establish paternity and secure support,, id. § 602(a) (17) (A); work
incentive programs, id. § 602(a)(19)(A)(i), and medical assistance plans, id.
§ 1396a(a)(10).
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ceptable." 39 Finally, by requiring states to make a cost-of-living adjustment to any AFDC payment "maximums" they impose, Congress had
encouraged states using a flat maximum system to change to a percentage
system "that will more equitably apportion those funds in fact allocated
for welfare .... -40
Because the Rosado Court refused to require an increase in AFDC
payments, the California Supreme Court a year later concluded that the
1967 amendment as interpreted by Rosado was not concerned with
reaching the truly destitute.4 If Section 402(a) (23) was to have any
practical effect, the California court reasoned, it must have been intended
to bring an additional group of families-those with marginal income or
resources-within the AFDC standard of need so that they would qualify
for work incentive and other AFDC-related benefits.
The issue that the California court faced in Villa v. Hall 42 was whether
the state could deduct outside income from the standard of need before
applying a percentage reduction factor or statutory maximum to the
amount of need remaining. The state argued that the percentage reduction or statutory maximum could first be applied to the standard of need.
Outside income would then be deducted from the amount of need remaining.
The California court held that Rosado barred this latter approach, 48
reasoning that "by subtracting income from a ratably reduced figure or
from a statutory maximum, a state could successfully avoid the [Rosado]
court's interpretation that the amendment was designed to increase the
number of people eligible for aid. ' 44 To illustrate this, the court gave as
an example a family of two with outside income of $201 a month. If the
state's standard of need for a family of two was $250 and its ratable reduction was 80 per cent ($200), the family would qualify for AFDC aid
only if its $201 income were deducted from the standard of need ($250),
with the 80 per cent reduction applied to the unmet need of $49. To deduct outside income after the percentage reduction would disqualify the
family even though its income was less than the level established by the
state as necessary for subsistence.
The California court relied heavily on a definition of "ratable reduc39. 397 U.S. at413.
40. Id. at 414.
41. Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227, 234, 490 P.2d 1148, 1153, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460,
465 (1971).
42. 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P.2d 1148, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1971).
43. Id.
44, 1d, at 234, 490 P.2d at 1153, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
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tion" and the effect of outside income that had been given by the Rosado
Court:
A "ratable reduction" represents a fixed percentage of the standard of need that
will be paid to all recipients. In the event that there is some income that is first
deducted, the ratable reduction is applied to the amount by which the individual
45
or family income falls short of need.

The issue of how to deduct outside income from an AFDC standard of
need reached the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Hackney. 46
The petitioners, who were black and Mexican-American recipients of
AFDC aid in Texas, were upheld by the three-judge district court in their
argument that the ratable reduction system used in Texas violated the
intent of Congress in Section 402 (a) (23).47 When this decision was vacated and remanded in light of Rosado, appellants in a motion to amend
argued that while a percentage reduction system may be consistent with
the congressional intent, the procedure used by Texas in accounting for
outside income violated that intent.48
Like California and 17 other states,4 9 Texas first determined an AFDC
recipient's standard of need, then applied a percentage reduction factor
and then subtracted any non-exempt income the recipient had earned.50
If outside income exceeded the ratable reduced standard, the family
would not qualify for AFDC aid or AFDC-related noncash benefits. The
system disqualified a number of families who would have been eligible
for AFDC aid had Texas followed the alternative system of deducting
outside income from the standard of need and then applying the percentage reduction factor.51
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, acknowledged that
45. 397 U.S. at 409, n.13.
46. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
47. 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
48. 406 U.S. at 538-39.
49. Id. at 539, n. 4.
50. A portion of earned income must be exempted as a work incentive. 42

U.S.C. § 602(a) (8).
51. In 406 U.S. at 539-40, n.6, the Court gives this example: "Assuming two
identical families, each with a standard of need of $200, and outside, nonexempt
income of $100, the two systems would produce these results:
Texas System
Alternative System
$

200

(need)

$ 200

(need)

x

.75

(% reduction factor)

-

100

(outside income)

$
$

150
100
50

(reduced need)
(outside income)
(benefits payable)

$

100
.75
75

(unmet need)
(% reduction factor)
(benefits payable)"

x
$
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while the alternative system provides a financial incentive for welfare
recipients to obtain outside income, "[t]he Texas computation method
eliminates any such financial incentive, so long as the outside income remains less than the recipient's reduced standard of need." 2 Nevertheless
the Court held that Texas, in raising its standard of need for AFDC recipients by 11 per cent, had fully met the congressional command of Section 402(a) (23) as defined by Rosado.58 As to the argument that fewer
persons would qualify for AFDC-related benefits, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
concluded that "there is nothing in the legislative history indicating that
this [maximizing individual eligibility for subsidiary benefits] was part of
the statutory purpose."5
By implication, the majority dismissed as dictum the Rosado Court's
definition of "ratable reduction" and its statement that "income . . . is
first deducted, [and) the ratable reduction is [then] applied . .. ."" The
holding of Rosado, the majority said, was that Section 402(a) (23) was
intended only to accomplish two purposes: (1) require states to face up
to the extent their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need, and (2)
prod the states to apportion payments more equitably. The Jefferson
Court held that when Texas raised its standard of need by 11 per cent
and shifted from a maximum grant system to a percentage reduction system, it fufilled these two requirements.
In strong dissenting opinions, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Marshall interpreted the congressional intent behind Section 402(a)
(23) much as the California court had done in Villa v. Hall.5 Both the
statute and Rosado, they said, require expanded eligibility for AFDCeven if the amount of payments is reduced-in order to make additional
persons eligible for subsidiary benefits. 7 In Mr. Justice Marshall's view,
the Texas system accomplished welfare reductions "surreptitiously...
by eliminating those persons who have marginal income. .. ." in violation of Rosado's holding that one purpose of the statute was "to force
States to realize the political consequences of reducing welfare payments."58 Arguing that neither statutory nor case history supports a judgment that permits states to deny aid to eligible persons, Mr. Justice Marshall said:
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
'58.

406 U.S. at 541.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. n.11, referring to the Rosado definition, 397 U.S. at 409, n.13.
6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P.2d 1148, 98 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1971).
406 U.S. at 551 and 558 (dissenting opinions).
Id. at 564 (dissenting opinion).

CASE NOTES

1972]

For me, this case is no different from King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(striking down substitute father regulation) or Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971) (striking down restriction on receipt of aid by college students). The State

procedure denies eligible persons aid, and regardless of the State's purposes, the
procedure cannot stand in conflict with the federal statute.5 9

The paucity of legislative history regarding Section 402 (a) (23) was
noted both in the Rosado0 and Jefferson6 ' decisions. The statute as originally proposed would have required the states to update standards of
need annually and to meet them in full. 62 Congress rejected the proposal
that states meet need and retained only the provision that the standard
used to determine need be updated.6 3 Further, Congress eliminated the
requirement for annual adjustments, substituting a single adjustment before July 1, 1969.64 A proposal by Senator McGovern that states be required to increase AFDC aid by four dollars a month was defeated.6"
At the same time, however, the training and self-help provisions added
to Section 402 by the 1967 social security amendments indicate:
.. .Congress's major concern was the provision of family counseling and rehabilitation services, work incentives, and family planning programs to reduce

out-of-wedlock births, for all persons in the family, in order to promote selfsupport and child development and to strengthen family life ....By making those
with marginal incomes eligible for AFDC by raising the standard of need, more
persons would be eligible for such services, which Congress considered vital to
cut down in the long run the numbers dependent on welfare. 66

The Jefferson Court found little to support this interpretation. More
significant, it found, was that at the same time Congress enacted Section
402(a) (23) it included another section designed "to induce States to reduce the number of individuals eligible for the AFDC program."'
Equal Protection Clause
Appellants in Jefferson also argued that the Texas AFDC system violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
59.
60.

Id. at 572 (dissenting opinion).
397 U.S. at 412.

61. 406 U.S. at 544.
62. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, Vol. 2,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3209
(1967).
63. See Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp. at 1388.

64. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, Vol. 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3209
(1967).

65. 113 Cong.Rec. 16,964 (daily ed. Nov.21, 1967).
66. 304 F.Supp. at 1389. See also U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, Vol. 2,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2837 (1967).
67. 406 U.S.at 544.
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Texas paid 75 per cent of AFDC need while paying 100 per cent of
recognized need to the aged and 95 per cent to the disabled and blind.
They argued that a state is obliged to apply the same percentage to each
of its welfare programs.""
Appellants said that since there is a larger percentage of blacks and
Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in the other programs, 9 the lower
percentage of aid paid to AFDC recipients reflects a racially discriminatory motive on the part of the state, and the state therefore must justify
its action by a compelling state interest.7" Similarly, they claimed that
the distinction between the programs violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,7 ' which prohibits racial discrimination in any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.
The Jefferson Court rejected all of these arguments. In response to
appellants' first contention, the Court said that while the four categories
of public assistance provided for in the Social Security Act have common
elements, there is no congressional mandate that all must be administered
72
equally.
The Court relied on the district court's findings that the Texas method
of payment to AFDC recipients "'is not the result of racial or ethnic
prejudice and is not violative of the federal Civil Rights Act or the
Equal Protection Clause. . . . ,,7' The district court had noted that there
had never been a reduction in the amount of money appropriated by the
state legislature to the AFDC program and that there had been five increases at the time the action was brought.7"
Finally, the Court concluded that the presence of more blacks and
Mexican-Americans in the AFDC program than in the others was not
alone determinative since "given the heterogeneity of the Nation's population, it would be only an infrequent coincidence that the racial com68. Id. at538.
69. Id. at 548. In 1969, the percentage of blacks and Mexican-Americans in
the four aid programs was: 87%, AFDC; 55.7%, Aid to the Blind; 46.9%, Aid
to Permanently and Totally Disabled, and 39.8%, Old Age Assistance.
70. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U;S. 618, 634 (1969): "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of . . . [a constitutional right], unless

shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional." (emphasis deleted).
71.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).

72.

406 U.S. at 546.

73.
74.

Id. at 547.
304 F. Supp. at 1339-40.
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position of each grant class was identical to that of the others."75 The
Court added:
Applying the traditional standard of review under that amendment [fourteenth],
we cannot say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat lower welfare benefits
for AFDC recipients is invidious or irrational. Since budgetary constraints do

not allow the payment of the full standard of need for all welfare recipients, the
State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able of the
categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of
living.70
Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent chose not to reach the issue of the
alleged racial discrimination, 77 concluding instead that, since "the basic
aims of the four programs are identical
the State concludes that the
standard of need is the same for recipients of aid under the four distinct
statutes, it is my opinion that Congress required that the State treat all
'7'
recipients equally with respect to actual aid."
The Jeflerson holding followed a pattern laid down earlier in equal
79
protection challenges by welfare recipients. In Shapiro v. Thompson,
the Court held that the state must meet a stringent "compelling interest"
test if its welfare restrictions infringed a constitutional right.8 But where
constitutional rights are not involved, the Court in Dandridge v. Williams81 said that the state need only show that its restrictions are reasonable. The Court in Shapiro invalidated a one-year residency requirement
for welfare benefits as violative of equal protection because it imposed
an unconstitutional restriction on the right to travel. But the Dandridge
Court, in upholding Maryland's maximum grant system of administering
its AFDC program, said:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
82
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Mr. Justice Marshall dissented sharply in Dandridge, arguing that the
most basic needs of impoverished human beings were at stake and that,
75. 406 U.S. at 548.
76. Id. at 549.
77. Id. at 577.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 577-78.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id.at 634.
397 U.S. 471 (1970).

82. Id. at 485.
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when children in large families are denied aid because of the maximum
grant system, there is "'a prima facie violation of the equal protection
requirement of reasonable classification,' compelling the State to come
forward with a persuasive justification for the classification.""s
Conclusion

Just as the Rosado decision made it clear that Section 402(a) (23)
does not require states to increase the amount of their AFDC payments,
the Jefferson decision approves a formula that permits states to decrease
the number of AFDC recipients. Congress's rejection of the original
AFDC amendment which would have mandated an increase in AFDC
payments is persuasive in the Rosado interpretation. In Jefferson, however, the Court interprets the federal statute even more narrowly, in effect
limiting congressional intent to the substitution of ratable reduction
formulas in place of statutory maximums in granting AFDC aid.
The absence of congressional debate on the measure is evidence that
Congress intended no major new expenditures as a result of Section 402
(a) (23). But by adding new self-help amendments to the Social Security
Act at the same time it approved Section 402(a) (23), Congress would
seem to have envisioned reaching more low-income families with the
training required to raise their standard of living. By tying eligibility for
the self-help programs to receipt of AFDC aid and then requiring states
to raise the AFDC standard of need, it seems reasonable that Congress
sought to add more minimal-income persons to AFDC in order that they
might qualify for training. There seems little point in requiring a state
to recognize a higher minimum subsistence level unless it results in
recognizing the needs of more families with bare subsistence incomes.
In rejecting this reasoning, Jefferson encourages the conclusion that
Congress intended Section 402 (a) (23) as window dressing, giving only
the appearance of confronting the problems of the poor. Under Rosado
and Jefferson, a state by simple changes in its bookkeeping method may
decrease the amount of its AFDC payments and reduce the number of
persons eligible for AFDC aid. Only the most cynical interpretation can
align this result with Congress's intent in passing the 1967 amendments.
83. Id. at 519 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). The Court in
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), while striking Illinois restrictions on
AFDC as applied to children attending college as inconsistent with the Social
Security Act, added in dictum that "we think there is a serious question whether

the Illinois classification can withstand the strictures of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 291. The Court indicated that were it to reach the equal protection
question, it would apply the "traditional test" of rationality to the state's classification.

